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Notes
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S
SHORTCOMINGS FOR POLICE DURING
SCHOOL SHOOTINGS
I. INTRODUCTION
On a normal day inside Wilson High School’s Room 110, three dozen
students talk excitedly of the weekend’s past events as they wait for
geometry class to begin.1 Suddenly, a frightening, reverberating sound
comes from the hallway—gunshots. On this bright Monday morning,
Billy decided to kill as many of his fellow students as possible for no
apparent reason. As he walks through the halls, firing arbitrarily at any
student in his path, the principal orders the school to initiate lockdown
procedures and immediately calls the police. When the police arrive,
they rush to quarantine the area by establishing a perimeter around the
school and assist only those students that escaped.
Following
department procedure, they are forced to sit outside the school for the
next hour and await the Special Weapons and Tactics (“SWAT”) team’s
arrival. As the police wait, they hear the unremitting shots coming from
inside the school. After the SWAT team arrives and nearly fifty innocent
lives are lost, Billy puts the guns down to surrender. He is arrested and
eventually sentenced to life in prison.
While the scenario above is merely fictional, the words “school
shooting” often arouse strong emotions of fear and anxiety in many
Americans.2 These same emotions are evoked when mentioning
Jonesboro, Arkansas; Columbine; Virginia Tech; or Northern Illinois
University.3 Although school shootings have plagued America for many
1
This scenario is entirely fictional and is not based upon any known true facts. Any
resemblance is merely coincidental.
2
Lesli A. Maxwell, School Shootings in Policy Spotlight: Safety Experts Say Best Idea is Level
Heads But Open Eyes, EDUC. WK., Oct. 11, 2006, available at http://www.edweek.org/ew/
articles/2006/10/11/07shoot.h26.html (noting the anxieties school shootings have created
for students, their families, school officials, and police).
3
See generally Timeline of School Shootings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORTS, Feb. 15, 2008,
http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/national/2008/02/15/timeline-of-schoolshootings.html?PageNr=1 (summarizing school shootings since 1966).
Additional
prominent school shootings are as follows: August 1, 1966, Charles Whitman killed sixteen
people and wounded thirty-one during a ninety-six-minute shootout from atop the
observation deck at the University of Texas-Austin; January 17, 1969, two students were
shot and killed during a student meeting at the University of California-Los Angeles;
December 30, 1974, Anthony Barbaro killed three adults and wounded eleven others at his
high school; February 22, 1978, a fifteen-year-old self-proclaimed Nazi killed one student
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years, they appear to be increasingly regular events in American society,
or at least more frequently reported by the media.4 To combat such
shootings, police officers are currently trained to take aggressive steps to
stop the shooter, including the use of deadly force.5
In today’s society, police conduct is a controversial topic.6 Although
police departments encourage the use of less lethal alternatives when
seizing or arresting suspects, courts often expect officers to refrain from
using deadly force.7 Consequently, there is a growing gap between
officer training as it relates to school shootings and judicial expectations
regarding officer conduct.8
This Note advocates that the current reasonableness test under the
Fourth Amendment must be amended to give greater deference to police
officers with regard to their use of deadly force when responding to
school shootings, while reducing the frequency of school shootings. Part
and wounded a second; August 12, 1986, five people are shot and one killed by a student at
New York Technical College in Brooklyn; November 1, 1991, a graduate student killed five
and wounded two at the University of Iowa; February 2, 1996, two students and one
teacher are killed and another wounded when a fourteen-year-old opened fire on his
algebra class; August 15, 1996, graduate student at San Diego State University killed three
professors while defending his thesis; December 1, 1997, three students are killed and five
wounded by a fourteen-year-old student at a high school in Paducah, Kentucky; December
15, 1997, two students are wounded by a fourteen-year-old who was hiding in the woods
when he shot the students standing in the parking lot; May 21, 1998, two teenagers are
killed and twenty wounded in a school shooting in Oregon; March 5, 2001, a fifteen-yearold student kills two and wounds thirteen in California; January 16, 2002, graduate student
at Appalachian School of Law killed the dean, a professor, and a student, while wounding
three; and October 2, 2006, gunman kills six at an Amish schoolhouse in Pennsylvania. Id.
4
See Timeline of School Shootings, supra note 3 (summarizing school shootings since 1966
and the increased frequency of school shootings annually).
5
See infra Part II.C (discussing changes in police policies and recent tactics police
departments are training their officers to use).
6
See J. Michael McGuinness & Melvin L. Tucker, Police Use of Force Standards Under
Colorado and Federal Law, 36 COLO. LAW. 47, 47 (2007) (“Police officer conduct is among the
most controversial public interest topics in the country.”).
7
See Neal Miller, Less-Than-Lethal Force Weaponry: Law Enforcement and Correctional
Agency Civil Law Liability for the Use of Excessive Force, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 733, 735 (1995)
(“One of the more innovative reforms is to increase the use of the less-than-lethal force
weapon (“LTL”) among police officers in order to limit resource to either deadly force or
injury-producing conventional force instruments.”). See also infra Part II.B (discussing the
reasonableness test set forth by the Supreme Court and the expectation that officers use
deadly force in limited circumstances).
8
See Alissa C. Wetzel, Comment, Georgia v. Randolph: A Jealously Guarded Exception—
Consent and the Fourth Amendment, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 499, 499 (2006) (“The history of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence traces the struggle of successive courts to define
‘reasonableness,’ and balance the competing needs of personal privacy and police
efficiency.”). See also infra Part II.B.1 (discussing common law principles and judicial
deference to police officers); Part III.B (noting the gap between the Fourth Amendment’s
reasonableness test and police officer training).
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II of this Note discusses school violence, new and old police policies in
response to school shootings, and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.9 Part III analyzes three
major problems with current attempts to remedy school violence, which
include:
the previous approaches to remedy school violence;
interpreting and applying the current Fourth Amendment
reasonableness test; and the recent, unclear police policies.10 Part IV
proposes establishing mandatory preventive measures and creating a
bright-line rule for situations in which officers respond to a school
shooting, thus eliminating the Fourth Amendment reasonableness test.11
II. BACKGROUND
Since the Columbine High School shootings, other highly publicized
school shootings have continued to instill fear in communities around
America.12 In response, educators, law enforcement officials, mental
health professionals, and parents have tried to prevent school violence.13
Additionally, in efforts to prevent large-scale casualties, police
departments have adopted aggressive tactics to neutralize perpetrators
in violent school attacks.14 Despite the apparent need for responsive
9
See infra Part II (discussing the current status of violence in schools and previous
legislative approaches to remedy the violence; the Court’s definition, interpretation, and
application of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment; and the divergence from the
old, inactive police procedures of quarantining to the new, proactive trend of eliminating
the shooter).
10
See infra Part III (analyzing problems with previous approaches to remedy school
violence, problems with interpreting and applying the current reasonableness test, and
problems with the recent, unclear police policies).
11
See infra Part IV (proposing the creation of mandatory preventive measures and a
bright-line rule for school shootings, which would replace the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness test in such situations).
12
See Maxwell, supra note 2 (“The spate of shootings has thrust school violence into a
national spotlight not seen since the 1999 slayings at Columbine High School in Jefferson
County, Colo.”).
Despite the fear, “school safety experts urged caution against
overreacting to the horrific, but rare, incidents in rural schools in Colorado, Pennsylvania,
and Wisconsin.” Id. See also ROBERT A. FEIN ET AL., U.S. SECRET SERV. & U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC., THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS: A GUIDE TO MANAGING THREATENING SITUATIONS
AND TO CREATING SAFE SCHOOL CLIMATES 3 (2002), http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac/
ssi_guide.pdf. “However, highly publicized school shootings have created uncertainty
about the safety and security of this country s [sic] schools and generated fear that an attack
might occur in any school, in any community.” Id.
13
See FEIN ET AL., supra note 12, at 3. In searching for explanations, these individuals
have tried to answer “two central questions: ‘Could we have known that these attacks
were being planned?’ and, if so, ‘What could we have done to prevent these attacks from
occurring?’” Id.
14
See Jerome Burdi, Fla. Police Department Training for Active Shooter in Schools: “We
Can’t Afford to Wait for the SWAT Team When Innocent People Can Be Dying Inside”
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police action, police departments must ensure the perpetrator’s Fourth
Amendment rights are protected.15 If they do not, they may be civilly
liable for their actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.16
Part II.A examines the prevalence of school violence in America and
the need for additional security measures.17 Part II.B defines excessive
force by reviewing the federal courts’ interpretation of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.18 Part II.C discusses the recent response
taken by law enforcement officials towards school violence.19

(July
13,
2007),
http://www.policeone.com/training/articles/1289217-Fla-policedepartment-training-for-active-shooter-in-schools/ (discussing new strategies and training
Florida police officers are required to undergo); First Shot Hits . . . Anytime! (Sept. 11, 2001)
[hereinafter First Shot Hits], http://www.policeone.com/training/articles/44362-Firstshot-hits-Anytime/ (noting that traditional firearms training is inefficient in real-life
scenarios, resulting in decreased accuracy of police officers and increased levels of stress);
Maxwell, supra note 2 (“In many communities, local law-enforcement officers stepped up
their presence near schools . . . .”); 20 Police from Four States and Volunteer Hostages
Prepare for a Situation They Pray Won’t (July 5, 2000), http://www.policeone.com/
training/articles/44494-20-police-from-four-states-and-volunteer-hostages-prepare-for-asituation-they-pray-wont/ (discussing new strategies and training techniques police
officers are required to follow).
15
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
16
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a
statute of the District of Columbia.
Id.
17
See infra Part II.A (discussing the current trends in school violence and the attempts to
remedy it).
18
See infra Part II.B (defining excessive force and the interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment).
19
See infra Part II.C (discussing the traditional and contemporary police policies
regarding active school shootings).
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A. Violence in Schools
School-associated violent deaths rarely occur, but when they do,
they tend to have far-reaching effects on the surrounding communities,
as well as throughout the entire United States.20 These events tend to be
so rare that, on average, less than two percent of youth homicides occur
at school.21 Statistics remained under two percent from July 1, 1992
through June 30, 1999, indicating that there was no significant increase in
the number of youth homicides at schools.22 Since that time, however,
the number of school deaths have fluctuated greatly.23 A reasonable
explanation for this fluctuation and overall decrease in violence could be
See INST. OF EDUC. SCIS., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND
SAFETY: 2007 (2007), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/crimeindicators/crimeindicators2007/
ind_01.asp. A school-associated violent death is defined as “a homicide, suicide, legal
intervention (involving a law enforcement officer), or unintentional firearm-related death
in which the fatal injury occurred on the campus of a functioning elementary or secondary
school in the United States.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). The study further noted that
“[v]iolent deaths at schools are rare but tragic events with far-reaching effects on the school
population and surrounding community.” Id. Often the targets of these crimes are
students, staff members, and others who are not students. Id.
21
See Maxwell, supra note 2 (noting that people should listen to officials and refrain from
overreacting to horrific, but rare, school shootings). “Between the 1992–93 and 2001–02
school years, 116 were killed in 93 incidents by students in U.S. schools . . . .If you divide
those incidents by 119,000 schools, it turns out that the average school can expect
something like this once every 12,000 years . . . .” Id. (internal quotations omitted). See also
INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 2007, supra note 20. “The percentage of youth
homicides occurring at school remained at less than 2 percent of the total number of youth
homicides over all available survey years even though the absolute number of homicides of
school-age youth at school varied to some degree across the years.” Id. It was further
noted that, “[f]rom July 1, 2005, through June 30, 2006, there were 35 school-associated
violent deaths in elementary and secondary schools in the United States,” while the overall
number of homicides for this age group in 2004–05 reached 1534. Id. Consequently, youth
were over fifty times more likely to be murdered and over 150 times more likely to commit
suicide off-campus, than on-campus. Id.
22
See INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 2007, supra note 20. “During this
period, between 28 and 34 homicides of school-age youth occurred at school in each school
year.” Id.
23
See id. “The number of homicides of school-age youth at school declined between the
1998–99 and 1999–2000 school years from 33 to 13 homicides. The number of homicides of
school-age youth at school increased from 11 to 21 between the 2000–01 and 2004–05 school
years, but dropped to 14 in 2005–06.” Id. See also INST. OF EDUC. SCIS., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
TABLE 1.1. NUMBER OF SCHOOL-ASSOCIATED VIOLENT DEATHS, HOMICIDES, AND SUICIDES OF
YOUTH AGES 5–18, BY LOCATION AND YEAR:
1992–2006 (2007), http://nces.ed.gov/
programs/crimeindicators/crimeindicators2007/tables/table_01_1.asp?referrer=report
(noting that from 1992–93 there were fifty-seven deaths; 1993–94, forty-eight deaths; 1994–
95, forty-eight deaths; 1995–96, fifty-three deaths; 1996–97, forty-eight deaths; 1997–98,
fifty-seven deaths; 1998–99, forty-seven deaths; 1999–2000, thirty-six deaths; 2000–01, thirty
deaths, 2001–02, thirty-seven deaths; 2002–03, thirty-five deaths; 2003–04, thirty-six deaths;
2004–05, fifty deaths; and 2005–06, thirty-five deaths).
20
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attributed to the decreased presence of weapons on campus properties.24
Despite the lower presence of weapons and violence, student absentee
rates rose due to unsafe feelings at school or on their way to or from
school.25 As a result, schools, police, governments, and parents have
made efforts to prevent school violence by altering school and police
policies.26
Schools can be the first line of defense against violence, but it is often
difficult to assess potential threats because characteristics and
backgrounds of perpetrators vary.27 Recognizing this, the Federal
See NAT’L CTR. FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH PROMOTION, TRENDS IN
PREVALENCE OF SELECTED RISK BEHAVIORS FOR ALL STUDENTS NATIONAL YRBS: 1991–
2007 (2007), http://www.cdc.gov/HealthyYouth/yrbs/pdf/yrbs07_us_summary_trend_
all.pdf. The Youth Risk Behavior Survey (YRBS) is conducted every two years,
representative of all high school students, both in private and public schools throughout
the United States. Id. The students were surveyed regarding whether they had carried a
weapon (knife, gun, or club, etc.) to school on at least one day during the thirty days before
the survey. Id. The survey reported: in 1991, 26.1% of students had carried a weapon;
1993, 22.1%; 1995, 20.0%; 1997, 18.3%; 1999, 17.3%; 2001, 17.4%; 2003, 17.1%; 2005, 18.5%;
and 2007, 18.0%. Id.
25
See id. Students were surveyed on whether they had missed at least one day of school
during the thirty days before the survey because they felt unsafe at school or on their way
to or from school. Id. The survey reported: in 1993, 4.4% had not attended; 1995, 4.5%;
1997, 4.0%; 1999, 5.2%; 2001, 6.6%, 2003, 5.4%; 2005, 6.0%; and 2007, 5.5%. Id.
26
See Maxwell, supra note 2. “The three school shootings that left a principal and six
students dead in less than a week have sparked a barrage of pledges from national and
state political leaders to tighten campus security.” Id.
27
See id.
The string of attacks—two by intruders, one by a student—began on
Sept. 27, when a 53-year-old gunman took six female students hostage,
sexually assaulted them, and killed one before shooting himself in a
classroom at Platte Canyon High School in Bailey, Colo.
Two days later, Eric Hainstock, 15, fatally shot his principal at Weston
High School in Cazenovia, Wis., a farming community about 70 miles
northwest of Madison.
And on Oct. 2, a 32-year-old milk truck driver laid siege to a one-room
Amish schoolhouse in Lancaster County, Pa., shooting and killing five
girls, ages 7 through 13, before killing himself. Five other girls were
seriously wounded in the attack, and one of them, a 6-year-old, was
reported to have been discharged from the hospital to die at home.
Id. See also Family of Gay Boy Says Dress Code Led to Killing, EDUC. WK., Aug. 15, 2008,
available at http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2008/08/15/145667cgaystudentkilled
lawsuit_ap.html (discussing that the family of the gay teenager blamed the school district
for allowing their son to wear makeup and feminine clothing to school, which could have
led to his death). Not only is difficult to assess potential threats, but determining threats
based on profiling may not be an effective deterrent. See Melissa G. Cohen, Note &
Comment, They Appear To Be The Same, But They Are Not The Same . . . A Student Profiling
Technique Will Not Effectively Deter Juvenile Violence in Our Schools, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.
RTS. 299 (2000) (arguing that student profiling is not an effective deterrent to crime in
American schools).
24

THE
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Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), Secret Service, and United States
Department of Education (“Department of Education”) joined together
to aid schools by developing threat assessment programs.28 Congress,
with pressure from special interest groups, has also attempted to
promote safe schools by passing numerous statutes and providing
schools with additional funding to curb school violence.29

See MARY ELLEN O’TOOLE, FED. BUREAU OF INV., THE SCHOOL SHOOTER: A THREAT
ASSESSMENT PERSPECTIVE 7–8 (1999), http://www.fbi.gov/publications/school/school2.
pdf (noting specific factors to be used in threat assessment such as specific, plausible
details; emotional content of a threat; and any precipitating stressors).
Specific, plausible details are a critical factor in evaluating a
threat. Details can include the identity of the victim or victims; the
reason for making the threat; the means, weapon, and method by
which it is to be carried out; the date, time, and place where the
threatened act will occur; and concrete information about plans or
preparations that have already been made.
Id. at 7 (emphasis removed). Additionally, the amount of detail can be a factor because
substantial planning and greater detail shows more preparation and therefore should be
considered high risk, whereas less detailed threats should be considered low risk. Id. at 7–
8. The next factor is the emotional content of a threat which can produce clues regarding
the threat maker’s mental state. Id. at 8. Although these threats may give clues to the
mental state, they are not helpful for measuring danger; therefore, it is difficult to
determine the amount of risk that should be assigned to them. Id. The last factor is
precipitating stressors. Id. These are “incidents, circumstances, reactions, or situations that
can trigger a threat. The precipitating event may seem insignificant and have no direct
relevance to the threat, but nonetheless becomes a catalyst.” Id. See also FEIN ET AL., supra
note 12, at iii (“Since June 1999, the U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Secret
Service have been working as a team to try to better understand and ultimately help
prevent school shootings in America.”); WILLIAM S. POLLACK ET AL., U.S. SECRET SERV. &
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF POTENTIAL SCHOOL-BASED VIOLENCE:
INFORMATION STUDENTS LEARN MAY PREVENT A TARGETED ATTACK (2008),
http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac/bystander_study.pdf; BRYAN VOSSEKUIL ET AL., U.S.
SECRET SERV. & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE FINAL REPORT AND FINDINGS OF THE SAFE SCHOOL
INITIATIVE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PREVENTION OF SCHOOL ATTACKS IN THE UNITED STATES
(2002), http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac/ssi_final_report.pdf.
29
See MEMBERS OF THE NAT’L SAFE SCHS. P’SHIP, BRIDGING THE GAP IN FEDERAL LAW:
PROMOTING SAFE SCHOOL AND IMPROVED STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT BY PREVENTING BULLYING
AND HARASSMENT IN OUR SCHOOLS
2 (2007), http://www.glsen.org/binarydata/GLSEN_ATTACHMENTS/file/000/000/912-1.pdf (recommending Congress amend
federal law to ensure that schools and districts have comprehensive and effective student
conduct policies, schools and districts focus on prevention strategies and professional
development to address bullying and harassment, and states and districts maintain
bullying and harassment data); National Education Association, Partnership Calls on
Congress to Help Prevent Bullying (July 2007), http://www.nea.org/tools/30446.htm
(noting that over thirty leading groups have called on Congress to take action to prevent
bullying and harassment in schools). See also infra notes 30–35 and accompanying text
(discussing the numerous acts Congress passed in attempts to curb school violence).
28
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Congress’s first effort was the Gun-Free School Zones Act passed in
1990, but was later found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.30 In
response, Congress created the Gun-Free Schools Act in 1994, noting that
the presence of guns near schools affected interstate commerce.31 This
Act required state schools receiving federal funds to suspend individuals
violating the law.32 The Act also it mandated that possessing a firearm
on school grounds was a felony offense and subjected violators to
criminal prosecution.33
Since the Gun-Free School Act, senators have proposed additional
legislation to deter school violence and upgrade school safety
programs.34 Specifically, these bills increased spending by providing
See James C. Hanks, Weapons in Schools, in SCHOOL VIOLENCE: FROM DISCIPLINE TO
DUE PROCESS 15 (James C. Hanks ed., 2004) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000)).
In 1995, the Supreme Court held the Gun-Free School Zones Act
unconstitutional, as exceeding Congress’s power under the Commerce
Clause. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). As it read at the
time, the statute “made it a federal offense ‘for any individual
knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or
has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.’”
Id. at 15 n.1 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. V))).
31
See Hanks, supra note 30, at 15 n.1 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1) (2000)).
In addition, the statute now contains a jurisdictional requirement,
which prohibits only knowing possession of “a firearm that has moved
in . . . interstate or foreign commerce” in a school zone. Id. § 922(q)(2)(A)
(emphasis added). The Amended Gun-Free Schools Act has been
upheld as a constitutional exercise of Congress’s commerce power.
See, e.g., United States v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037, 1039 (8th Cir. 1999).
Id. Consequently, “[t]he Gun-Free Schools Act, as Spending Clause legislation, is not
subject to the same constitutional vulnerability as the pre-Lopez Gun-Free School Zones
Act.” Id. at 15 n.2 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 7151 (Supp. 2003)).
32
See id. at 16 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7151 (b)(1)).
The Gun-Free Schools Act requires states receiving federal funds for
education to enact state laws that require “local educational agencies to
expel from school for a period of not less than 1 year a student who is
determined to have brought a firearm to school, or to have possessed a
firearm at school.”
Id. See also Ann Majestic, Carolyn Waller & Julie Devine, Disciplining the Violent Student
with Disabilities, in SCHOOL VIOLENCE: FROM DISCIPLINE TO DUE PROCESS 155 (James C.
Hanks ed., 2004) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 8921 (1994)) (“At the federal level, Congress has passed
legislation requiring schools that receive federal funds to institute a mandatory 365-day
suspension for any student who brings a gun to school.”).
33
See Hanks, supra note 30, at 16–17 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(4)) (“A violation is
punishable by a fine and up to five years’ imprisonment.”).
34
See School Safety and Law Enforcement Improvement Act of 2007, S. 2084, 110th
Cong. 1 (2007) (noting its purpose was “[t]o promote school safety, improved law
enforcement, and for other purposes.”); School Safety Enhancements Act of 2007, S. 1217,
110th Cong. 1 (2007) (stating its purpose was “[t]o enhance the safety of elementary
schools, secondary schools, and institutions of higher education.”); School Safety
30
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additional funds to schools that complied with various safety
requirements.35 As a result of these financial benefits, states and schools
have implemented additional safety standards and programs.36
In many states, possessing a firearm on school grounds is illegal.37
Despite general similarities regarding gun possession, punishments for
Enhancements Act of 2007, S. 677, 110th Cong. 1 (2007) (indicating its purpose was “[t]o
improve the grant program for secure schools under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968.”). See also School Safety and Law Enforcement Improvement Act of
2007, S. REP. NO. 110-183 (2007) (report to S. 2084, explaining information regarding the
proposed bill).
The bill provides a responsible and effective congressional
response to school incidents that have occurred in the recent past and,
in particular, to the tragedy that took place on April 16, 2007 on the
campus of Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia
Tech) in Blacksburg, Virginia. The bill is intended in part to address
the recurring problem of violence in our schools through additional
support to law enforcement in both public and private educational
settings, and to make needed improvements to the National Instant
Criminal Background Check System.
Id. at 2.
35
See S. 2084, at 3–5, 12 (proposed “striking $30,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2001
through 2009 and inserting $50,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2008 and 2009” for those
schools that use surveillance equipment, locks, lighting, metal detectors, other measures,
establish hotlines or tiplines, use capital improvements to make schools more secure,
conduct safety assessments, conduct security training, coordinate with federal, state, and
local law enforcement, test emergency response, and develop and implement a campus
emergency response plan) (internal quotations omitted); S. 1217, at 2, 4–5 (proposing
“striking $30,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2001 through 2009 and inserting $50,000,000 for
each of the fiscal years 2008 and 2009” for those schools that use surveillance equipment,
establish hotlines or tiplines, use capital improvements to make schools more secure,
conduct annual campus safety assessments, and develop and implement a campus
emergency response plan) (internal quotations omitted); S. 677, at 2–4 (proposing “striking
$30,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2001 through 2009 and inserting $50,000,000 for each of
the fiscal years 2008 and 2009” for those schools that use surveillance equipment, establish
hotlines or tiplines, and use capital improvements to make schools more secure) (internal
quotations omitted).
36
See infra notes 37–52 and accompanying text (discussing state and school programs
implemented).
37
See Hanks, supra note 30, at 16 & n.5. Sample statutes include:
CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9(b) (West 2003) (prohibiting the possession of
a firearm in a school zone); FLA. STAT. ch. 790.115 (2002) (prohibiting
the possession of any weapon “at a school-sponsored event or on the
property of any school, school bus, or school bus stop,” and
prohibiting the exhibition of any weapon within 1,000 feet of a school
during school hours or activities); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127.1 (2002)
(prohibiting the possession of specified weapons in “school safety
zones”); IOWA CODE § 724.4B(1) (2003) (prohibiting the possession of a
firearm on the grounds of a school); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.2
(West 2003) (prohibiting the possession of firearms and “dangerous
weapons” on “a school campus, on school transportation, or at any
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violating the state statutes vary greatly.38 For example, in Iowa, the fine
imposed for carrying a gun inside a school zone is double the fine
imposed for carrying a gun outside a school zone.39 California’s statute
is similar, but the punishment “ranges from a three-month sentence in
county jail to a five year sentence in state prison” and applies to offenses
that occur in institutions of higher learning.40 Georgia’s statute,
however, is stricter than both of these because it applies to elementary or
secondary schools, technical schools, vocational schools, colleges,
universities, and other institutes of post-secondary education.41 Under
the Georgia statute, possessing a weapon is also a felony punishable “by
a fine of not more than $10,000, by imprisonment for not less than two
nor more than ten years, or both.”42 While states implemented different
criminal sanctions, school policies focused primarily on prevention.43
For schools, zero-tolerance policies are the most common method of
prevention.44 Although these policies are credited with reducing school
school sponsored function . . . , or within one thousand feet of any
school campus”); WIS. STAT. § 948.605(2) (2003) (making it a felony to
possess a firearm in a school zone).
Id.
See id. at 17 (noting that the laws impacting weapons possession vary in terms of
scope and punishments).
39
See id. (citing IOWA CODE § 724.4A(2) (2003)). The Iowa Code on Weapons Free Zones
provides:
1. As used in this section, “weapons free zone” means the area in or on,
or within one thousand feet of, the real property comprising a public
or private elementary or secondary school, or in or on the real property
comprising a public park. . . .
2. Notwithstanding sections 902.9 and 903.1, a person who commits a
public offense involving a firearm or offensive weapon, within a
weapons free zone, in violation of this or any other chapter shall be
subject to a fine of twice the maximum amount which may otherwise
be imposed for the public offense.
IOWA CODE § 724.4A (2008). It further provides:
1. A person who goes armed with, carries, or transports a firearm of
any kind, whether concealed or not, on the grounds of a school
commits a class “D” felony. For the purposes of this section, “school”
means a public or nonpublic school as defined in section 280.2.
Id. § 724.4B(1).
40
Hanks, supra note 30, at 17 & nn.15–16 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9(f) (West 2003)).
41
See id. at 17–18 & n.18 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127.1 (2002)).
42
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127.1(b).
43
See infra notes 45–52 and accompanying text (discussing school’s prevention policies).
44
A zero-tolerance policy “provides predetermined consequences for specific offenses.”
David M. Pedersen, Zero-Tolerance Policies, in SCHOOL VIOLENCE: FROM DISCIPLINE TO DUE
PROCESS 47, 48 (James C. Hanks ed., 2004) (citing Alicia C. Insley, Comment, Suspending and
Expelling Children From Educational Opportunity: Time to Reevaluate Zero Tolerance Policies, 50
AM. U. L. REV. 1039, 1043 (2001)) (noting that in 1998, nine out of ten public schools had
employed zero-tolerance policies for firearms and weapons). “A zero-tolerance program’s
38
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violence, they are criticized for inflexibility and over-inclusiveness.45
They are also detrimental to learning environments because school
administrators are not afforded discretion; rather, students are
automatically punished even for unintentional policy violations, which
can hinder student development.46 As a result, experts advocating for
additional safety plans in schools have warned against losing
perspective and fortressing schools; however, many schools continue to
use these policies and sometimes extend the policies to apply to other

goal is to act as a deterrent and provide swift intervention for misconduct, sending a
strong, ‘one strike and you’re out’ message to students.” Rhonda B. Armistead, Zero
Tolerance:
The School Woodshed, EDUC. WK., June 11, 2008, at 24, available at
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2008/06/11/41armistead_ep.h27.html.
For a
continued and detailed discussion of zero-tolerance policies, see Nora M. Findlay, Should
There Be Zero Tolerance For Zero Tolerance School Discipline Policies?, 18 EDUC. & L.J. 103
(2008); Paul M. Bogos, Note, “Expelled. No Excuses. No Exceptions.”—Michigan’s ZeroTolerance Policy In Response To School Violence: M.C.L.A. Section 380.1311, 74 U. DET. MERCY
L. REV. 357 (1997); Alicia C. Insley, Comment, Suspending and Expelling Children From
Educational Opportunity: Time To Reevaluate Zero Tolerance Policies, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1039
(2001); Sheena Molsbee, Comment, Zeroing Out Zero Tolerance: Eliminating Zero Tolerance
Policies In Texas Schools, 40 TEX. TECH L. REV. 325 (2008).
45
See Pedersen, supra note 44, at 47 (“The decrease in violent crime may be attributed to
the increasing application of ‘Zero-Tolerance Policies’ to serious student offenses.”).
However:
Overtones of absolutism and inflexibility accompany zero-tolerance
policies, leading education and legal scholars to sharply criticize such
policies. Under zero-tolerance policies, educators are often unable to
distinguish between threats to school safety and innocent mistakes by
students. The following is an example of a rigid application of zerotolerance policies to seemingly innocuous behavior:

A student at Blue Ridge Middle School in Loudon County,
Virginia, was suspended for 16 weeks after he convinced a
suicidal friend to give him the knife she intended to use to kill
herself. The student put the knife in his locker and reported the
incident to the principal. While the school praised the student for
helping his friend, the school board determined that the student’s
actions violated the school’s zero-tolerance policy with respect to
possession of weapons and suspended the student.
Id. at 49. See also Armistead, supra note 44 (“Few policies in education have proven to be as
universally ineffective—even counterproductive—as ‘zero-tolerance.’”).
46
See Armistead, supra note 44 (discussing how zero-tolerance policies are solely
punitive and are counterproductive to the school’s primary goals of learning and
development).
Such a one-size-fits-all framework seriously limits administrators’ use
of their professional judgment in a given situation, and often forces
them to impose punishments they otherwise feel are inappropriate to
the facts. It also fails to take into account the intricacies of child
development, individual characteristics, risk factors, and underlying
causes, all of which shape behavior.
Id.
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immature and illegal behaviors.47 Despite the prevalence of zerotolerance policies, schools have also used other alternative methods to
ensure safety.48
The most radical alternative can be found in Texas, where one school
district recently allowed teachers to carry concealed weapons.49 This is
See Maxwell, supra note 2.
But aside from carrying out existing safety plans, experts urged a
measured response to the shootings. Any new safety policies and
increased security measures should be done in a thoughtful way,
without turning schools into fortresses, they said. “Understandably,
there is a rush in these situations to do something and that gives the
illusion that things will be safer,” said Dewey G. Cornell, an education
professor and the director of the Virginia Youth Violence Project at the
University of Virginia in Charlottesville. “But the tragedy and distress
of these events in our schools can make us lose perspective.”
Id. “Despite the zero-tolerance concept’s shortcomings, however, states and school districts
have extended its reach beyond weapons and drugs, to include an array of behaviors, such
as sexual harassment, bullying, and dress-code violations.” Armistead, supra note 44.
48
See Maxwell, supra note 2 (noting that some educators have enforced precautions by
locking doors and forcing visitors to check in before being allowed to walk school
hallways); Texas Students Pack Bookbags; Teachers Pack Heat, EDUC. WK., Aug. 25, 2008,
available at http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2008/08/25/150810guntotingteachers_
ap.html (noting that a high school in Texas locked doors and had security cameras). A
better policy is to have “an awareness of your school environment.” Maxwell, supra note 2.
Other methods have created real and imagined barriers such as signs warning against
guns, drugs, and trespassing, or the presence of more adults. Id. However, it has also been
warned that “[t]hose features tend to become more a pacifier than a panacea . . . .” Id.
Meanwhile, some students are being instructed to fight back using whatever is
available. See Alan Scher Zagier, Colleges Confront Shootings with Survival Training
(Aug. 27, 2008), http://www.policeone.com/school-violence/articles/1729501-Collegesconfront-shootings-with-survival-training/. “The training discourages cowering in a
corner or huddling together in fear . . . . Instead, Metropolitan Community College faculty
members were taught to be aware of their surroundings and to think of common classroom
objects—such as laptops and backpacks—as ‘improvised weapons.’” Id.
49
See Texas School District OKs Pistols for Staff, EDUC. WK., Aug. 15, 2008, available at
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2008/08/15/145829bctxguntotingteachers_ap.html
(discussing a Texas school district’s decision to allow teachers to carry pistols); Texas
Students Pack Bookbags; Teachers Pack Heat, supra note 48 (discussing reactions to a Texas
school district’s decision to allow teachers to carry pistols). Before being permitted to carry
a firearm. a teacher: must possess “a Texas license to carry a concealed handgun; must be
authorized to carry by the district; must receive training in crisis management and hostile
situations and have to use ammunition that is designed to minimize the risk of ricochet in
school halls.” Texas School District OKs Pistols for Staff, supra. The superintendent justified
the decision because it is a small community which is thirty minutes from the sheriff’s
office and “‘[w]hen you outlaw guns in a certain area, the only people who follow that are
law-abiding citizens, and everybody else ignores it.’” Id. However, both students and
parents have had mixed reactions to the new policy. Id. See also Jennifer Frederick, Do As I
Say, Not As I Do: Why Teachers Should Not Be Allowed To Carry Guns On School Property, 28
J.L. & EDUC. 139 (1999) (arguing that teachers are role models for children so if we do not
want children to bring guns to school, then teachers should not either); David B. Kopel,
47
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the only school district in the country allowing such a policy.50 More
traditional alternatives, such as anti-violence programs or requiring
police presence on school premises, are popular among high schools.51
Despite pressures to change, some districts have not altered their
methods of addressing violence, but instead have enhanced expulsion
policies and threatened students with greater punishments.52 Even with
the apparent improvements and attempts to remedy school violence,
surveys show that schools are still vulnerable to attack.53
Beginning in 2001, the National School Safety and Security Services
conducted a survey for the National Association of School Resource
Officers (“NASRO”).54 School Resource Officers (“SROs”) reported that
Pretend “Gun-Free” School Zones: A Deadly Legal Fiction, 42 CONN. L. REV. 515, 515 (2009)
(analyzing the empirical evidence and policy arguments regarding licensed campus carry
policies and advocating that “complete prohibition of armed defense on school campuses
by all faculty and by all adult students is irrational and deadly”); Brian J. Siebel, The Case
Against Guns On Campus, 18 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 319 (2008) (advocating that guns
should not be allowed on college campuses).
50
See Texas School District OKs Pistols for Staff, supra note 49; Texas Students Pack Bookbags;
Teachers Pack Heat, supra note 48.
51
See Leah M. Christensen, Sticks, Stones, and Schoolyard Bullies: Restorative Justice,
Mediation and a New Approach to Conflict Resolution in Our Schools, 9 NEV. L.J. 545, 546 (2009)
(discussing the effects of bullying, mediation, and other conflict resolution programs, and
“consider[ing] the Social Inclusion Approach, a program based upon the work of Kim John
Payne, M.Ed., an international educator and counselor who developed a restorative justice
approach to deal with conflict in schools, as a mechanism to effectively prevent and handle
bullying in schools.”); Kathleen M. Cerrone, Comment, The Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994:
Zero Tolerance Takes Aim at Procedural Due Process, 20 PACE L. REV. 131, 155 (1999) (citing
Jean Rimbach & John Mooney, Whitman Unveils Plan to Cut School Violence, THE RECORD
(N.J.), Sept. 4, 1998, at A3) (noting that the “district has instituted peer-mediation and
leadership programs and it plans to create a new group to present anti-violence assemblies
and that officials have seen beneficial effects from police presence by providing “training in
school violence prevention, conflict mediation, counseling, sexual harassment, and how to
handle secret tips from students.”). But see Scott Buhrmaster, Should Campus Cops Carry
Guns? One College President Says No (Nov. 19, 2003), http://www.policeone.com/
writers/columnists/Scott-Buhrmaster/articles/72520-Should-campus-cops-carry-gunsOne-college-president-says-no/ (discussing a president’s opposition to armed officers on a
community college’s campus). “When asked to explain her anti-armed officer position she
replied, ‘Much of the research shows that having armed public safety officers on campus
increases the chances for more violence.’” Id.
52
See Cerrone, Comment, supra note 51, at 154 (citing Kathleen Parrish & Christian D.
Berg, Pennsylvania Bill Seeks Millions to Fight School Violence: State Representative Julie Harhart
will Introduce the Law With Attorney General's Backing, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, Sept. 15,
1998, at A1).
53
See infra notes 54–63 and accompanying text (discussing annual surveys revealing
security problems at schools).
54
See generally KENNETH S. TRUMP, NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. RES. OFFICERS, 2001 NASRO
SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER SURVEY 1 (2001), http://www.schoolsecurity.org/resources/
2001NASROsurvey%20NSSSS.pdf [hereinafter 2001 NASRO SURVEY] (“[T]his survey
information is drawn from the largest sampled population of SROs from the front-lines of

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 4 [2010], Art. 5

1108 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

their programs improved school safety, prevented crime and violence,
and fostered positive relationships between students and faculty.55
Many SROs also reported preventing assaults against faculty and staff.56
A majority of SROs reported that they believed an armed SRO did not
put students at a greater risk of harm, but that an unarmed SRO did
increase the risk of harm.57 Overall, the 2001 SRO survey illustrated
school safety improvements, but similar surveys conducted from 2002–
2004 revealed a different trend.58
school safety.”). A sixty-one question survey was developed and distributed at a schoolbased police officer conference. Id. A total of 1000 surveys were distributed and 717 of
them were returned, twenty-eight of which were completed by school administrators. Id.
These twenty-eight surveys were voided and the findings were based upon the results of
the other 689 surveys. Id.
55
Id. at 2 (finding that 99% (683) respondents believed their SRO programs were
successful). Furthermore, rating relationships on a scale of one to five (one being poor and
five being excellent), respondents reported having an average relationship rate of 4.40 with
school administrators, 4.39 with students, 4.36 with school support staff, and 4.27 with
teachers. Id.
56
See id. at 5 (finding that 67% (460) of respondents had prevented an assault by a
student or other individual for an approximate total of 3200 cases in their combined
careers, thus averaging seven per officer). Furthermore:
A total of 92% of the respondents reported preventing from 1 to 25
violent acts in an average school year. 57% (394) of School Resource
Officers report preventing 11 or more acts of violence in an average
school year, with 28% (190) of them reporting that they prevent more
than 25 violent acts in an average year. An additional 35% (240) of
respondents report preventing between 1 and 10 violent acts in an
average year. Only 2% report that they have not prevented a violent
incident in an average school year.
Id. SROs have also reported that:
approximately 24% (165) of the respondents have taken a loaded
firearm from a student or other individual on campus . . . .Of the 24%
officers who have taken a loaded firearm, an approximate total of 344
incidents have occurred during their SRO careers for an average of
over 2 times per officer.
Id. at 6.
57
Id. at 3 (finding that 98% (673) of respondents did not believe armed SROs put
students in harm, and 91% (625) of respondents believed that unarmed SROs put students
in harm).
58
See KENNETH S. TRUMP, NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. RES. OFFICERS, SCHOOL SAFETY LEFT
BEHIND? SCHOOL SAFETY THREATS GROW AS PREPAREDNESS STALLS & FUNDING DECREASES
4–6 (2004), http://www.schoolsecurity.org/resources/2004%20NASRO%20Survey%20
Final%20Report%20NSSSS.pdf [hereinafter 2004 NASRO SURVEY] (noting that threats
continued to persist, school plans remained inadequate, and funding decreased); KENNETH
S. TRUMP, NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. RES. OFFICERS, SCHOOL SAFETY THREATS PERSIST, FUNDING
DECREASING: NASRO 2003 NATIONAL SCHOOL-BASED LAW ENFORCEMENT SURVEY 6 (2003),
http://www.schoolsecurity.org/resources/2003NASROSurvey%20NSSSS.pdf [hereinafter
2003 NASRO SURVEY] (asserting that threats and problems continued to persist due in part
to lack of funding); KENNETH S. TRUMP, NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. RES. OFFICERS, 2002 NASRO
SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER SURVEY 4 (2002), http://www.schoolsecurity.org/resources/
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The most significant findings of the 2002 survey revealed major
security issues, such as terrorism, threat response, and SRO training.59 In
2002NASROSurvey%20NSSSS.pdf [hereinafter 2002 NASRO SURVEY] (stating schools were
highly vulnerable to attack and would not be able to respond adequately); 2001 NASRO
SURVEY, supra note 54, at 14 (noting in its conclusion that from the SROs perspective, the
programs were successful in improving school safety, but further noting that the safety
threats continue to remain clear and real, and officers need to be effectively trained and
equipped).
59
See 2002 NASRO SURVEY, supra note 58, at 4 (contending that 95% of SROs reported
their schools were vulnerable to terrorist attacks, 79% reported their districts could not
adequately respond to an attack, a majority reported their school crisis plans were
inadequate and untested, and finally, that SROs reported having limited training and
minimal support from outside agencies, which was attributable to a lack of funding).
Regarding the easy ability to access schools, “96% of SROs described gaining access to
outside school grounds during school hours as very easy (74%) or somewhat easy (22%).
83% of school officers described gaining access to inside of their school as very easy (37%)
or somewhat easy (46%).” Id. at 7. In finding that most safety plans were inadequate due
to insufficient implementation, review, and revision, the 2002 survey found:
•
39% of the officers reported that a formal security assessment by a
qualified professional has not been conducted of their school in the
past five years.
•
71% of the respondents were involved in developing and/or revising
their school crisis plans, yet 55% felt that the plans for their schools are
not adequate.
•
52% of the SROs reported that the crisis plans for their school have
never been tested and exercised, and in those schools where plans
have been tested, the amount and/or type of testing has not been
adequate, according to 62% of the respondents.
•
74% of school officers responded that their schools do not educate
parents and communicate effectively with parents on school safety,
security, and crisis planning issues.
Id. In finding that several federal school safety initiatives and/or federal agencies were not
helpful, the 2002 survey reported:
•
While 36% of the respondents found reports by the U.S. Secret Service
on assessing and managing school violence threats helpful, nearly half
of the officers had never heard of the reports and 15% reported that the
reports did not provide any new information.
•
72% of the officers surveyed said that the FBI was not helpful to them
in their day-to-day work as a school-based officer.
•
Only 25% of the SROs reported that the U.S. Department of
Education’s Safe and Drug Free Schools Program provided funding to
directly support their work. 35% reported receiving no funding and
40% were uncertain as to whether the program provided any direct
support.
•
Only 28% of the SROs reported that the U.S. Department of
Education’s Safe and Drug Free Schools Program provided resource
materials that have been helpful to them in their day-to-day work as
school-based officers. 39% reported receiving no materials and 33%
were uncertain as to whether the program provided any resource
materials.
Id. at 9.
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addition, the survey found that a large majority of SROs carried firearms
believing it was beneficial to the safety of the school and students.60 The
survey also reported that over a quarter of SROs had confiscated a
firearm, while nearly three times as many had confiscated knives.61
Consequently, the 2002 survey illustrated major vulnerabilities in the
nation’s schools, many of which were repeated in the 2003 and 2004
surveys.62 As a result, police officers are being charged with the
See id. at 10 (noting that 95% carried firearms and 99% did not believe armed SROs put
students at additional risks of harm, while 90% believed not carrying a firearm did put
students at additional risks of harm).
61
See 2002 NASRO SURVEY, supra note 58, at 10 (noting that twenty-nine percent of SROs
confiscated a loaded firearm, while eighty-eight percent of SROs had confiscated a knife
from a student).
62
See 2003 NASRO SURVEY, supra note 58, at 4 (noting that many threats continue to be
made against U.S. schools); 2002 NASRO SURVEY, supra note 58, at 12 (reporting that the
majority of school officers indicated significant gaps in school plans and policies).
The 2003 survey revealed that school safety threats persisted, large gaps continued to
exist in threat response programs, and low funding caused greater inadequacies. See 2003
NASRO SURVEY, supra note 58, at 4–5. The survey found:
Over 70% of the officers reported that aggressive behaviors in
elementary school children has increased in their districts in the past
five years. . . . Over 55% of the respondents said that their school crisis
plans are not adequate. . . . Over 41% of school-based police officers
report that funding for school safety in their schools is decreasing.
Over 85% of the survey respondents believe that the U.S. Department
of Education’s 2004 proposed budget cut of 35% ($50 million) for state
funding of the Safe and Drug Free Schools program will contribute to
schools being less safe.
Id. As a result, the survey concluded that school violence and underpreparedness
continued to persist, due in part to the lack of funding available to schools. Id. at 6
(revealing that the majority of SROs indicated that their crisis programs are inadequate, the
preparedness of schools had not improved, and the funding is inadequate to support safe
school environments).
Similarly, the 2004 survey exposed similar trends. See 2004 NASRO SURVEY, supra
note 58, at 4–6 (substantiating claims that crime and violence continue to threaten U.S.
schools, schools remain vulnerable to attack, gaps in policies remain prevalent, and
funding either remained the same or decreased). The key findings of the 2004 survey
revealed that violence and safety offenses continued to threaten schools, SROs believed
that gaps continued to remain in school crisis policies, and funding continued to either
remain the same or decline. See id. at 4 (noting that 78% of SROs had reported confiscating
a weapon from a student in the past year, 51% of SROs said crisis plans were inadequate,
43% of SROs indicated that school officials do not formally meet with other emergency
responders, more than 55% of SROs said that school faculty do not receive ongoing training
for emergency situations, and over 70% of SROs reported that school safety funding either
decreased or remained the same). Consequently, the 2004 NASRO survey found little to no
positive change in school safety, thus evidencing that attempts to remedy school violence
by Congress, states, and schools have had little effect and that school violence will remain
as a prevalent concern amongst officials at all levels, students, and their families. See id. at
7 (“It would be expected that three years after 9/11 and five years after Columbine High
School attack, the preparedness level of schools should have improved.”). See also
60

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss4/5

Pratt: The Fourth Amendment's Shortcomings for Police During School Shoo

2010]

Shortcomings in School Shootings

1111

responsibility of responding quickly to school violence in order to disable
perpetrators, while at the same time remaining mindful of the
perpetrator’s constitutional rights by refraining from excessive force.63
B. Excessive Force Defined
“In accomplishing police objectives, officers are given great power
and authority.”64 Police officers’ ability to use force is the greatest
display of authority to which they are entitled; however, the type and
degree of force must be proportional to the threat in order to accomplish
the officer’s objective.65 Before discussing the current trends in the law,
one must understand why and how those principles were established.66
Part II.B.1 focuses on the history of the use of force, beginning with
ancient history and the common law principles of excessive force.67 Part
II.B.2 then discusses the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to
excessive force claims, focusing only on the second prong of the
reasonableness test.68 Finally, Part II.B.3 reveals the inconsistency among
the federal circuits in analyzing excessive force claims.69

O’TOOLE, supra note 28, at 33 (discussing the continuing concern of families, despite the
overall decline of violence in schools).
Overall, the level of violence in American schools is falling, not
rising. But the shock and fear generated by the recent succession of
school shootings and other violent acts in schools—and by violence in
society at large—have led to intense public concern about the danger
of school violence.
Id.
63
See infra Part II.B (defining excessive force and the Supreme Court’s interpretation).
See also UREY W. PATRICK & JOHN C. HALL, IN DEFENSE OF SELF AND OTHERS . . . ISSUES,
FACTS & FALLACIES—THE REALITIES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT’S USE OF DEADLY FORCE 11–12
(2005) (noting the three amendments within the Constitution that protect against force,
mainly the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, but further noting that the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments fall outside the parameters of deadly force).
64
BRIAN A. KINNAIRD, USE OF FORCE: EXPERT GUIDANCE FOR DECISIVE FORCE RESPONSE 1
(2003).
65
See id. “The use of force is the most significant display of authority and control that all
law enforcement officers possess. The type and amount of force that can be used, however,
depends on exercising sound judgment and competence in accordance with legal
guidelines and department policy.” Id.
66
See id. (discussing the history of the use of force); PATRICK, supra note 63, at 3
(discussing the common law background of the use of force).
67
See infra Part II.B.1 (tracing the background of the use of force and its development
through the common law).
68
See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the current status of excessive force and the Court’s
interpretation).
69
See infra Part II.B.3 (examining the lower federal courts’ application of the
reasonableness test).
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Historical Background and the Use of Force During the Common
Law Era

It is undisputed that throughout history the use of force and
punishment has taken various forms.70 For example, during the biblical
period (3000 B.C.–A.D. 500), stoning was considered to be an appropriate
punishment and could be imposed by the public.71 Then, during the
Medieval Era (A.D. 500–1000), victims chose the appropriate punishment
to be imposed upon the perpetrators.72 This approach continued until
the state took sole responsibility and control over formalized
punishments and the use of force.73 This new formalized period, known
as the common law era, spanned from the mid-1600s to the early 1900s.74
Under the common law, police officers were given great deference
and were authorized to use deadly force in many different situations.75
This lasted for most of America’s history because the Bill of Rights
restrained only the powers of the Federal Government.76 After the
Fourteenth Amendment was passed and incorporated, however, states
KINNAIRD, supra note 64, at 1 (explaining the various ages throughout history and
using a few illustrations).
71
See id. (noting that prior to formal written codes of law and morality, the public was
responsible for determining appropriate punishments).
72
See id. (suggesting that “these were practiced as ‘non-legal’ initiatives long before the
legal use of force was ever developed”).
73
See id. at 1–2 (asserting that from the Middle Ages to the late 1600s, procedures were
developed to create less erratic punishments against offenders and that “the state governed
the imposition of the use of force in an attempt to prevent individuals from using it in ways
that violated others’ natural rights”).
74
See id. at 2 (noting that from 1650–1830 policing and punishment remained public and
corporal, but with Sir Robert Peel’s uniformed patrol divisions and investigative units, the
early police forces were created). Despite this early formation, it was not until the late
1800s that most of the cities in the United States had established police forces with formal
operations. Id.
75
See PATRICK, supra note 63, at 4 (discussing common law principles and noting the
great deference given to officers); Forrest Plesko, Comment, (Im)balance and
(Un)reasonableness: High-Speed Police Pursuits, The Fourth Amendment, and Scott v. Harris, 85
DENV. U. L. REV. 463, 463 (2007) (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12 (1985))
(suggesting that a police officer could shoot a fleeing suspect). With respect to the
authority of police officers to use deadly force, the 18th century English jurist William
Blackstone explained that such authority would exist in the following circumstances:
“[1] Where an officer in the execution of his office . . . kills a person that
assaults or resists him.
[2] If an officer . . . attempts to take a man charged with felony, and is resisted;
and in the endeavor to take him, kills him.
[3] In all these cases, there must be an apparent necessity . . . otherwise,
without such absolute necessity, it is not justifiable.”
PATRICK, supra note 63, at 4 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *179–80, *203–
04).
76
See PATRICK, supra note 63, at 4.
70
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had to abide by the Bill of Rights and could not deprive citizens of their
Fourth Amendment rights.77
2.

The Fourth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s Interpretation

Under the Fourth Amendment, individuals have the right to be
secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.78 A seizure “occurs
only when government actors have, ‘by means of physical force or show
of authority, . . . in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.’”79
Proving only that a seizure occurred is not enough to violate the Fourth
Amendment; the seizure must also be unreasonable.80 Thus, the basic
See IAONNIS G. DIMITRAKOPOULOS, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES UNDER THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION: THE CASE LAW OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 365 & n.1 (2007) (citing
Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30–34 (1963);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949));
PATRICK, supra note 63, at 4. However, even after incorporation, courts used the
substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to evaluate excessive force
claims. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952) (holding that pumping a suspect’s
stomach to obtain evidence and ensure a conviction ‘shocked the conscious’ and offended
the Due Process Clause); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1031 (2d Cir. 1973). Under
substantive due process, Judge Friendly set forth four factors to determine the liability.
Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033. They are as follows: the need for the application of force, the
relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of injury
inflicted, and whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. Id. This
test, however, was short-lived because approximately ten years later, the Supreme Court
determined that the reasonableness test under the Fourth Amendment provided the proper
analysis for alleged unconstitutional seizures. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702
(1983).
78
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
79
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19
n.16 (1968). See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 627–28 (1991) (citing United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)); Brower, 489 U.S. at 596–97 (noting that a seizure
could only occur if it was intentional; desired termination or incidental termination was not
enough). Furthermore, “[a]n arrest requires either physical force . . . or, where that is
absent, submission to the assertion of authority.” Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626.
80
See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395–96 (discussing seizure and reasonableness); Brower, 489
U.S. at 599–600 (holding that the police actions constituted a seizure, but remanded the case
to determine whether the seizure was unreasonable); Bouggess v. Mattingly, 482 F.3d 886,
889 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting the reasonableness test set forth in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1,
7 (1985)); Thomas K. Clancy, The Future of Fourth Amendment Seizure Analysis After Hodari
D. and Bostick, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 799 (1991) (noting that before the reasonableness
question is determined, there must be a determination of whether a seizure has occurred);
Ken Wallentine, How To Ensure Use of Force is “Reasonable and Necessary” and Avoid
Claims of Excessive Force (Sept. 5, 2007), http://www.policeone.com/training/articles/
1271618-How-to-ensure-use-of-force-is-reasonable-and-necessary-and-avoid-claims-ofexcessive-force/ (citing Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767 (7th Cir. 2003)) (“An officer may use
only that force which is both reasonable and necessary to effect an arrest or detention.”). To
dispel any confusion, unreasonable use of force and excessive force are essentially the same
77
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purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard individuals from
“arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.”81 As a result, an
individual’s expectations of privacy are weighed against the
government’s interest of preventing crime.82 In balancing these interests
and fashioning reasonableness standards, the Court remains
conscientious of three basic principles: workability, reasonability, and
objectivity.83
The Supreme Court’s first critical decision regarding a police
officer’s liability for the use of deadly force was Tennessee v. Garner.84 In
Garner, the Court considered the constitutionality of deadly force by a
police officer to prevent the escape of an unarmed burglar.85 Justice
because excessive force has been defined as those actions “[o]utside of what is considered
‘reasonably necessary’ under statutory provisions . . . .” KINNAIRD, supra note 64, at 5.
Despite this, the author gives his own definition of reasonable force as “that force the
officer, by necessity, needs to use in order to gain control and maintain control of a subject,
or defend a life, based on the common sense factors and any training the officer has
received.” Id. at ix (emphasis removed).
81
DIMITRAKOPOULOS, supra note 77, at 365 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 554 (1976)). “The evil toward which the Fourth Amendment was primarily
directed was the resurrection of the pre-Revolutionary practice of using general warrants
or ‘writs of assistance’ to authorize searches for contraband by officers of the Crown.” Id. at
365 (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1977); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 624–29 (1886)).
82
See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,
703 (1983); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981); Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 654 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976)). See also
DIMITRAKOPOULOS, supra note 77, at 397 (noting that the balancing of these interests is the
key principle to the Fourth Amendment); Clancy, supra note 80, at 799 (citing United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Prouse, 440 U.S. 648; Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
83
DIMITRAKOPOULOS, supra note 77, at 389, n.247–49 (citing Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S.
765, 772–73 (1983)).
84
471 U.S. 1 (1985). In Garner, Cleamtee Garner brought a wrongful death suit against
the Memphis Police Department after their officers shot and killed his son, Edward Garner
(“Garner”). Id. at 4. At approximately 10:45 p.m., Memphis police officers were dispatched
to respond to a suspected burglary. Id. at 3. Upon arrival, Officer Hymon (“Hymon”) went
behind the house and saw an individual run across the backyard. Id. Using a flashlight,
Hymon was able to see Garner’s face and hands, but no sign of a weapon. Id. While
Garner was crouched next to the fence, Hymon yelled, “police, halt” and walked towards
Garner. Id. at 4. As Hymon advanced, Garner began to climb over the fence. Id.
Convinced that Garner would escape, Hymon decided to shoot, and the bullet hit Garner in
the back of the head. Id. Garner died from his injuries at the hospital. Id.
85
Id. at 3. The Federal District Court for the Western District of Tennessee entered
judgment for the defendants, concluding that Hymon’s actions were authorized by the
Tennessee statute, which was also deemed constitutional. Id. at 5. The Court further found
Hymon’s actions to be “the only reasonable and practicable means of preventing Garner’s
escape. Garner had recklessly and heedlessly attempted to vault over the fence to escape,
thereby assuming the risk of being fired upon.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed with regard to Hymon, but remanded the issue of
possible city liability because Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Social Servs,, 436 U.S. 658 (1978),
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White, writing for the majority, concluded that “such force may not be
used unless it is necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has
probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of
death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.”86 The Court
reasoned that it was better for all felony suspects to escape than to die,
especially when the suspect posed no immediate threat to the officer or
others.87 As a result, the Tennessee statute was found unconstitutional
as applied.88 However, it was not unconstitutional on its face because
had been handed down after the district court’s decision. Id. The district court concluded
that its prior decision was unaffected, but the court of appeals reversed and remanded the
case. Id. at 6. The court of appeals concluded that the Tennessee statute was
unconstitutional reasoning that the killing of a fleeing suspect constituted a seizure under
the Fourth Amendment and therefore must be deemed reasonable. Id.
86
Garner, 471 U.S. at 3. Finding the individual’s rights outweighed the government’s,
the Court rejected the following arguments proposed by the government and the dissent:
(1) overall violence will be reduced because suspects will not flee if they know they will be
shot; (2) the Fourth Amendment must be construed in light of the commonlaw rule, thus
police should be allowed to use whatever force is necessary against a felon; and (3) the
shooting was justified because the officer had probable cause to believe that Garner had
committed a burglary. Id. at 9, 12, 21. The Court concluded that these arguments were
invalid because (1) shooting a nonviolent suspect is not a justifiable reason to use deadly
force, (2) a large number of police departments and state statutes do not allow for deadly
force when preventing the escape of a suspected felon, (3) the legal and technological
advancements do not justify the reliance upon the common-law rule, (4) many of the
crimes formerly punishable by death no longer exist, and (5) a suspected burglar, without
regard to other circumstances, should not automatically justify deadly force. Id. at 10–11,
13–14, 21.
87
Id. at 11. The Court noted:
It is no doubt unfortunate when a suspect who is in sight escapes, but
the fact that the police arrive a little late or are a little slower afoot does
not always justify killing the suspect. A police officer may not seize an
unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead.
Id. See also Andrew T. George, Comment, Rediscovering Dangerousness: The Expanded Scope
of Reasonable Deadly Force After Scott v. Harris, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 145, 146 (2007),
available at http://virginialawreview.org/inbrief.php?s=inbrief&p=2007/07/09/george
(discussing Tennessee v. Garner, suggesting that it was “a case of the right Constitutional
rule wrongly applied”).
88
Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. The Tennessee Statute provides:
(a) A law enforcement officer, after giving notice of the officer's
identity as an officer, may use or threaten to use force that is
reasonably necessary to accomplish the arrest of an individual
suspected of a criminal act who resists or flees from the arrest.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), the officer may use deadly force to
effect an arrest only if all other reasonable means of apprehension have
been exhausted or are unavailable, and where feasible, the officer has
given notice of the officer's identity as an officer and given a warning
that deadly force may be used unless resistance or flight ceases, and:
(1) The officer has probable cause to believe the individual to be
arrested has committed a felony involving the infliction or threatened
infliction of serious bodily injury; or
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where an officer has probable cause to believe the suspect posed a threat
of serious physical harm to officers or others, deadly force is reasonable
to prevent escape.89 Therefore, the Court noted that it must decide
“whether the totality of the circumstances justified a particular sort of
search or seizure.”90 Determining reasonableness and the appropriate
analysis under this test posed problems for lower courts.91 As a result,
the test was clarified three years later in Graham v. O’Connor.92
In Graham, the Supreme Court determined “what constitutional
standard governs a free citizen’s claim that law enforcement officials
used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop,
or other ‘seizure’ of his person.”93 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
(2) The officer has probable cause to believe that the individual to
be arrested poses a threat of serious bodily injury, either to the officer
or to others unless immediately apprehended.
(c) All law enforcement officers, both state and local, shall be bound by
the provisions in this section and shall receive instruction regarding
implementation of this section in law enforcement training programs.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982).
89
Garner, 471 U.S. at 11.
Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is
probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the
infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force
may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible,
some warning has been given.
Id. at 11–12.
90
Id. at 8–9.
91
See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 594 (1989) (reporting that the district court
granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss because using a roadblock during a high-speed
pursuit was reasonable under the circumstances; a divided panel for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed); Plesko, Comment, supra note 75, at 466 (noting that because Garner is factspecific and is determined upon the reasonableness of the officer’s actions in light of the
totality of the circumstances, confusion continued to plague the lower courts until Graham
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)).
92
490 U.S. 386 (1989).
93
Id. at 388. In this case, Dethorne Graham (“Graham”) sought damages for injuries
sustained when an officer used force against him during an investigatory stop. Id.
Graham, a diabetic, felt the onset of an insulin reaction and asked his friend, William Berry
(“Berry”), to drive him to a convenience store to buy some orange juice. Id. Berry agreed,
but upon arriving and entering the store, Graham saw numerous people in the check-out
line and as a result, hurried out of the store, requesting Berry to drive him to a friend’s
house. Id. Seeing Graham leave the store in a hurry, Officer Connor (“Connor”) became
suspicious and decided to follow Berry’s car. Id. at 389. A little distance down the road,
Connor decided to perform an investigatory stop and Berry related to Connor that Graham
was suffering from a “sugar reaction.” Id. Hearing this, Connor ordered Berry and
Graham to remain where they were, while he determined if anything had occurred at the
store. Id. When Connor returned to his car to call for backup, Graham exited the car, ran
around it twice, and sat down on the curb where he passed out briefly. Id. Once backup
arrived, the officers rolled Graham over and handcuffed him, all the while ignoring Berry’s
pleas to get Graham some sugar. Id. The officers then lifted Graham up, carried him to
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majority, held that such claims should be analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment’s objective reasonableness test, rather than the substantive
due process standard of the Fourteenth Amendment.94 The Court
reasoned that the Fourth Amendment provided more guidance than
substantive due process by offering an “explicit textual source of
constitutional protection against this sort of physically intrusive

Berry’s car, and placed him face down on the hood. Id. Graham regained consciousness
and pleaded for the police to check his wallet for his diabetes decal, but the officers
continued to ignore him and shoved his face in the hood. Id. The officers then grabbed
Graham and threw him headfirst into the back of the patrol car. Id. Meanwhile, Graham’s
friend brought some orange juice for him, but the officers refused to let Graham have it. Id.
Finally, Connor discovered that Graham had done nothing wrong at the convenience store
and the officers drove him home. Id. As a result of this encounter, Graham suffered a
broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a bruised forehead, an injured shoulder, and claims to have
a loud ringing in his right ear. Id. at 390.
94
See id. at 388 (vacating the Fourth Circuit’s decision and remanding it for
reconsideration under the proper Fourth Amendment standard). As the court explained:
Today we make explicit what was implicit in Garner’s analysis, and
hold that all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive
force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or
other “seizure” of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment and its “reasonableness” standard, rather than under a
“substantive due process” approach.
Id. at 395. See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (stating that when analyzing the
reasonableness of a particular search or seizure, “it is imperative that the facts be judged
against an objective standard”). But see Graham, 490 U.S. at 399–400 (Blackmun, Brennan, &
Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (determining that there
appears to be no reason for deciding that “prearrest excessive force claims are to be
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment rather than under a substantive due process
standard” and deciding not to join “in foreclosing the use of substantive due process
analysis in prearrest cases”). At the original jury trial, the district court granted the
defendant’s motion for a directed verdict after considering four factors. Graham v. City of
Charlotte, 644 F. Supp. 246, 248 (W.D.N.C. 1986).
The factors to be considered in determining when the excessive use of
force gives rise to a cause of action under § 1983 are identified as
(1) The need for the application for the force.
(2) The relationship between the need and the amount of the force
that was used.
(3) The extent of the injury inflicted.
(4) Whether the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain
and restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm.
Id. (citing King v. Blankenship, 636 F.2d 70 (4th Cir.1980)). In applying these factors, the
district court found that the amount of force was appropriate under the circumstances,
there was no discernable injury, and the force was not applied for the very purpose of
causing harm, but instead was used to maintain order. Id. at 248–49. On appeal, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court had applied the correct legal standard,
approving the four-factor test, and concluding that a jury could not find that force was
unconstitutionally excessive. Graham, 490 U.S. at 391.
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governmental conduct.”95 With the proper standard established, the
Court shifted its focus to the question of reasonableness.96
In discussing reasonableness, the Court reaffirmed that the Fourth
Amendment required a careful balancing between individual and
governmental interests, noting that reasonableness cannot be precisely
defined or mechanically applied.97 As a result, courts must be attentive
to the facts and the circumstances of each case, noting the crime’s
severity, the immediacy of the threat to others, and whether the
individual is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest.98 In
applying the test, the Court further reaffirmed that courts are to refrain
from judging in hindsight or considering underlying intent or
motivation.99 The Court reasoned that officers are often forced to make
split-second decisions in tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving
situations.100 Many of the principles in Graham were reaffirmed in the
2007 opinion Scott v. Harris.101

Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
Id. at 396.
97
Id. (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985); United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
696, 703 (1983); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)).
98
Id. (quoting Garner, 471 U.S. at 8–9) (considering the totality of the circumstances
against the justifiability of the officer’s actions).
99
Id. at 396–97 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20–22) (reasoning that courts must judge the
actions from the perspective of the reasonable officer on the scene, “rather than with the
20/20 vision of hindsight”). The Court noted that since the proper test is an objectively
reasonable test, “[a]n officer’s evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation
out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer’s good intentions make an
objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional.” Id. at 397 (citing Scott v. United
States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)). Thus,
“[t]hat test [Johnson v. Glick test], which requires consideration of whether the individual
officers acted in ‘good faith’ or ‘maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm,’ is incompatible with a proper Fourth Amendment analysis.” Id. See also Scott, 436
U.S. at 137 (“[I]n evaluating alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment[,] the Court has
first undertaken an objective assessment of an officer's actions . . . .”); Troupe v. Sarasota
County, 419 F.3d 1160, 1166–67 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Force regardless of the form directed to a
driver . . . does not give rise to a due process deprivation claim unless it was exercised with
‘a purpose to cause harm’ unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest.”) (quoting LandolRivera v. Cruz Cosme, 906 F.2d 791, 796 (1st Cir. 1990)).
100
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. See Martin A. Swartz, The High-Speed Police Pursuit Decision,
N.Y.L.J. 3, July 24, 2007 (recognizing that officers have to make difficult split-second
decisions with no time for real deliberation); Travis N. Jensen, Note, Cooling the Hot Pursuit:
Toward a Categorical Approach, 73 IND. L.J. 1277, 1280 (1998) (“[E]very police officer must
perform what becomes a complex balancing test in the seconds before each decision to
pursue.”).
101
550 U.S. 372 (2007). However, it has also been suggested that Scott v. Harris is a
departure from precedent and is an expansion of the reasonableness test because it was
distinguished from Garner and considered without directly applying Graham. See George,
supra note 87, at 147–49 & n.18.
95
96
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In Scott, the Court focused its attention on the threshold question of
whether Deputy Scott’s actions violated the Fourth Amendment.102
Specifically, the Court asked “whether a law enforcement official can,
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, attempt to stop a fleeing
motorist from continuing his public-endangering flight by ramming the
motorist’s car from behind.”103 Justice Scalia, delivering the Court’s
Scott, 550 U.S. at 376. The Court reasoned that qualified immunity was not the proper
initial inquiry. Id. In Saucier v. Katz, the Court concluded that the initial inquiry must be
whether a constitutional right was violated. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
In the course of determining whether a constitutional right was
violated . . . a court might find it necessary to set forth principles which
will become the basis for a holding that a right is clearly established.
This is the process for the law's elaboration from case to case, and it is
one reason for our insisting upon turning to the existence or
nonexistence of a constitutional right as the first inquiry.
Id. at 201. Although relatively insignificant to the thesis of this Note, the Supreme Court
recently receded from the two-prong test set forth in Saucier. See Pearson v. Callahan, 129
S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009) (holding that although Saucier’s two-step sequence for resolving
qualified immunity claims is “often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as
mandatory”). See also Diana Hassel, Excessive Reasonableness, 43 IND. L. REV. 117 (2009)
(discussing Pearson and qualified immunity). Hassel proposes the following:
Addressing the problem of police violence, providing balance to
doctrine overly protective of defendants, and simplifying the
procedural morass that qualified immunity has created in excessive
force cases requires a radical modification of the doctrine. In excessive
force cases, the doctrine should be modified to protect a defendant
only when there has been a genuine change in the legal standard
governing his actions—not merely an application of established
doctrine to a somewhat new set of facts. Currently, qualified
immunity prevents liability if the defendant's actions do not violate
clearly established law “of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Instead, the standard should be that the defendant will be
liable unless his actions violate a newly developed legal standard. In
the excessive force context, the protection provided by the
reasonableness standard of Fourth Amendment, in conjunction with
this more limited defense based on a newly developed law, will
provide ample protection for the reasonably mistaken officer and will
make compensation for the victim possible.
Id. at 119–20.
103
Scott, 550 U.S. at 376. “Put another way: Can an officer take actions that place a
fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death in order to stop the motorist’s flight from
endangering the lives of innocent bystanders?” Id. In this case, a Georgia county deputy
decided to pull Victor Harris (“Harris”) over for speeding, but upon the sight of flashing
lights, Harris sped away. Id. During the chase, speeds exceeded eighty-five miles per
hour. Id. at 374–75. After hearing about the chase over his radio, Deputy Timothy Scott
(“Scott”) joined the pursuit. Id. at 375. During the pursuit, Harris pulled into a large
parking lot and the police attempted to box him in, but before they could, Harris was able
to escape by making a sharp turn and ramming into Scott’s car. Id. Scott then took over as
the lead pursuit vehicle where he decided to terminate the chase by employing a Precision
Intervention Technique (“PIT”) maneuver. Id. This maneuver would cause the fleeing
102
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opinion, held that such actions were reasonable and did not violate the
Fourth Amendment because the car chase posed a “substantial and
immediate risk of serious physical injury to others[.]”104
The Court began by distinguishing Scott from Garner.105 The Court
first noted that “Garner did not establish a magical on/off switch that
vehicle to spin out of control and terminate the pursuit. Id. After permission was granted
by Scott’s supervisor, Scott decided not to perform the maneuver, but instead apply his
push bumper to the back of Harris’ vehicle, causing Harris to lose control, leave the
highway, overturn, and crash. Id. As a result, Harris was rendered a quadriplegic. Id.
After hearing the facts of the case, the Court determined that the best option was to view
the dashboard video tape recording. Id. at 378–79. Although acknowledging that courts
are required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party, the Court noted that there was “an added wrinkle in this case” and since there were
no allegations or indications of tampering, the Court concluded that it was proper to rely
solely upon the videotape as an eyewitness. Id. at 378–80 (recognizing that such an
approach is appropriate when “opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is
blatantly contradicted by the record”). See Howard M. Wasserman, Video Evidence and
Summary Judgment: The Procedure of Scott v. Harris, 91 JUDICATURE 180, 182 (2008)
(suggesting that video can replace an eyewitness, making live testimony and corroboration
unnecessary, allowing courts to disregard testimony altogether even when considering a
motion for summary judgment). But see Erwin Chemerinsky, A Troubling Take on ExcessiveForce Claims, 43 TRIAL 74, 74 (2007) (viewing the use of videotapes as a “novel twist” on
judges’ decision-making and a likely trend in the future).
104
Scott, 550 U.S. at 386 (reversing the court of appeals’ decision to deny qualified
immunity). Harris brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming Scott’s actions were
excessive and constituted an unreasonable seizure, thereby violating his Fourth
Amendment rights. Id. at 375. In response, Scott filed a motion for summary judgment,
claiming he was protected under the theory of qualified immunity. Id. “The District Court
denied the motion, finding ‘there are material issues of fact on which the issue of qualified
immunity turns which present sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury.’” Id.
(quoting Harris v. Coweta County, No. 3:01-CV-148-WBH, 2003 WL 25419527, at *6 (N.D.
Ga. Sept. 3, 2003)). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
court’s decision to allow the case to proceed to trial because a reasonable jury could find
that Scott’s actions violated Harris’ Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 376 (citing Harris v.
Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807, 816 (11th Cir. 2005)). “The Court of Appeals further
concluded that ‘the law as it existed [at time of the incident], was sufficiently clear to give
reasonable law enforcement officers ‘fair notice’ that ramming a vehicle under these
circumstances was unlawful.’” Id. (citing Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807, 817 (11th
Cir. 2005)). See also Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202 (noting that in Anderson the Court emphasized
that the right allegedly violated by an official must have been ‘clearly established’).
It should not be surprising, therefore, that our cases establish that the
right the official is alleged to have violated must have been “clearly
established” in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense:
The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
105
Scott, 550 U.S. at 382–83. Harris urged the case be analyzed under the Garner,
reasoning that Scott’s actions constituted deadly force. Id. Citing Garner, Harris defined
deadly as “any use of force which creates a substantial likelihood of causing death or
serious bodily injury.” Id. (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 19 (1985)). Harris
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triggers rigid preconditions whenever an officer’s actions constitute
‘deadly force.’”106 As a result, judges must still “slosh [their] way
through the factbound morass of ‘reasonableness.’”107
“Sloshing” its way through, the Court could not quantify the
significant individual and government interests, and was instead
compelled to consider the number of lives and their relative
culpability.108 The Court concluded that Scott’s actions were reasonable
because Harris could have severely injured or killed multiple individuals
through his unlawful, reckless, and intentional acts.109 Using such
urged that under Garner, certain preconditions must be met before justifying Scott’s actions:
“(1) The suspect must have posed an immediate threat of serious physical harm to the
officer or others; (2) deadly force must have been necessary to prevent escape; and (3)
where feasible, the officer must have given the suspect some warning.” Id. Harris
concludes that since Scott cannot satisfy these requirements, his actions were “per se
unreasonable.” Id.
106
Id. Rather, “Garner was simply an application of the Fourth Amendment’s
‘reasonableness’ test, . . . to the use of a particular type of force in a particular situation.”
Id. Differentiating between the facts, the Court noted that the “threat posed by the flight
on foot of an unarmed suspect” was not “even remotely comparable to the extreme danger
to human life posed by respondent in this case.” Id. Therefore, since the facts of this case
differ from those in Garner, such preconditions are inapplicable. Id.
107
Id. at 384. Consequently, “all that matters is whether Scott’s actions were reasonable.”
Id. The appropriate “inquiry should be viewed from the perspective of a reasonable officer
on the scene, rather than with hindsight, and must allow for the fact that police officers are
often forced to make split-second judgments in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and
rapidly evolving.” No Constitutional Violation in Car Chase Fatality, 25 NO. 9 MCQUILLIN
MUN. L. REP. 4 (Sept. 2007). See J. Michael McGuinness, Law Enforcement Use of Force: The
Objective Reasonableness Standards Under North Carolina and Federal Law, 24 CAMPBELL L. REV.
201, 201 (2002) (stating that courts consider the facts of a particular case under the
circumstances as they appear to the officer at the time of the arrest); Plesko, supra note 75,
at 466 (determining reasonableness from the “perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight”). Applying any other test would
prove problematic. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205–06 (finding the Graham test problematic to
officers because it does not always give a clear answer whether courts will deem officers’
actions to be excessive); Jensen, supra note 100, at 1291–92 (recognizing that individual
officers must perform a complex balancing test in the seconds before each decision to act,
often under the influence of potentially prejudicial factors).
108
Scott, 550 U.S. at 383 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)). In
balancing the two, the Court determined that it must “consider the risk of bodily harm that
Scott’s actions posed to respondent [Harris] in light of the threat to the public that Scott
was trying to eliminate.” Id. In doing so, the Court noted it was clear from the videotape
that Harris’ actions imminently threatened the lives of pedestrians, civilian motorists, and
officers involved in the pursuit, while Scott’s actions only posed a high threat of serious
harm to Harris. See id.
109
Id. at 384.
It was respondent [Harris], after all, who intentionally placed himself
and the public in danger by unlawfully engaging in the reckless, highspeed flight that ultimately produced the choice between two evils that
Scott confronted. . . . By contrast, those who might have been harmed
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reasons, the Court impliedly resorted to the self-defense of others
doctrine.110 Meanwhile, Harris continued to argue that alternative
methods would have sufficed.111
The Court rejected Harris’s arguments reasoning that officers need
not hope for the best, nor create perverse incentives for suspects to
accelerate their speed and recklessness.112 Instead, the Court noted a
had Scott not taken the action he did were entirely innocent. We have
little difficulty in concluding it was reasonable for Scott to take the
action that he did.
Id. It has also been noted that those who create the risk and jeopardize the lives of others
should bear the risk of loss. See Michael Douglas Owens, Comment, The Inherent
Constitutionality of the Police Use of Deadly Force to Stop Dangerous Pursuits, 52 MERCER L.
REV. 1599, 1600 (2001). Owens argues that anytime a suspect flees from police, deadly force
is justified because it warrants both tactical operations and an interest to society
perspective. Id. “In short, the risks of injury or death from police pursuits should be upon
the violators who, by their flight, create the risks, rather than upon the citizenry in
general.” Id. But see Jensen, supra note 100, at 1278 (arguing that because of the inherent
risk of death or bodily injury, high-speed pursuits over minor crimes and traffic violations
are unacceptable).
110
See Richard P. Shafer, Annotation, When Does Police Officer’s Use of Force During Arrest
Become so Excessive as to Constitute Violation of Constitutional Rights, Imposing Liability Under
Federal Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C.A. § 1983), 60 A.L.R. FED. 204 (1982) (discussing the
standard for self-defense of others and citing cases to support the definition). “[A] person
is justified in using force likely to cause death or great bodily harm if one reasonably
believed that such force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to
oneself or another.” 41 C.J.S. Homicide § 499 (2008). See also CHARLES E. TORCIA,
WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 124 (15th ed. 1993) (“[T]he officer or private person, in
attempting to make an arrest, is performing a significant public function . . . and, if the
resistance escalates to such a degree as to threaten his life, he may resort to deadly force as
a matter or self-defense.”); 5 AM. JUR. 2D Arrest § 83 (2008) (“An officer's use of deadly force
is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the officer has probable cause to believe that
the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or
others.”); Chemerinsky, supra note 103, at 75 (“In other words, the Court had to balance the
officers' need to protect pedestrians and other drivers by stopping Harris's car against the
risk of injuring Harris.”); McGuinness, supra note 107, at 216–17 (“A person may intervene
and use force against another when it appears reasonably necessary in order to protect a
third person from harm.”); Jensen, supra note 100, at 1294 (“Considering the risk to
innocent third parties of death or serious bodily injury that accompanies each decision,
police pursuit is a major public concern.”).
111
See Scott, 550 U.S. at 385 (asking the rhetorical question: “Couldn’t the innocent public
equally have been protected, and the tragic accident entirely avoided, if the police had
simply ceased their pursuit?”); Plesko, supra note 75, at 478 (indicating that seventy percent
of jailed suspects involved in a car pursuit would have slowed down if police had
terminated the pursuit).
112
The Court rejected the, reasoning that “police need not have taken that chance and
hoped for the best.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 385. Consequently, the Court found it was certain
that ramming Harris’ car would have ended the pursuit and immediately eliminated the
risk, while ceasing pursuit would not certainly produce the same result. Id. at 385–86.
“Given such uncertainty, respondent might have been just as likely to respond by
continuing to drive recklessly as by slowing down and wiping his brow.” Id. at 385.
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more sensible rule: “[a] police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous
high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does
not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing
motorist at risk of serious injury or death.”113 Although the Court has
defined and established reasonableness as the proper standard for
Fourth Amendment excessive force claims, circuit courts have
inconsistently followed this standard.114
3.

Circuit Court Inconsistency When Analyzing Excessive Force Claims

“The time-frame is a crucial aspect of excessive force cases.”115 Even
after Garner and Graham, appellate courts disagree about the time-frame
of reasonableness.116 For instance, the First, Third, Sixth, and Ninth
Furthermore, the Court reasoned, “[i]t is obvious the perverse incentives such a rule would
create: Every fleeing motorist would know that escape is within his grasp, if only he
accelerates to 90 miles per hour, crosses the double-yellow line a few times, and runs a few
red lights.” Id. See also Owens, supra note 109, at 1637 (commenting that cessation would
only cause lawlessness and give criminals an incentive to push the limits).
113
Scott, 550 U.S. at 386. Justice Breyer, however, noted:
I disagree with the Court insofar as it articulates a per se rule. The
majority states: “A police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous
high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders
does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the
fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.” Ante, at 1779. This
statement is too absolute. As Justice GINSBURG points out, ante, at
1779–1780, whether a high-speed chase violates the Fourth
Amendment may well depend upon more circumstances than the
majority’s rule reflects.
Id. at 389 (Breyer, J., concurring).
114
See Eric S. Connuck, Constitutional Law: The Viability of Section 1983 Actions in Response
to Police Misconduct, 1990 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 747 (discussing the different standards
applicable depending upon the status of the individual as either a pre-arrest detainee or
pre-trial detainee); Mitchell J. Edlund, Note, In the Heat of the Chase: Determining Substantive
Due Process Violations Within the Framework of Police Pursuits When an Innocent Bystander is
Injured, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 161, 161–68 (1995) (discussing the level of culpability necessary to
invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause in police pursuit cases while discussing
the varying approaches taken by lower federal courts); R. Wilson Freyermuth, Comment,
Rethinking Excessive Force, 1987 DUKE L.J. 692, 694–95 (listing cases discussing the four
factors set forth in Johnson v. Glick); Aaron Kimber, Note, Righteous Shooting, Unreasonable
Seizure? The Relevance of an Officer’s Pre-Seizure Conduct in an Excessive Force Claim, 13 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 651, 665–75 (2004) (noting and discussing various federal circuit court
decisions to alter the reasonableness test after Graham); Daniel O’Connell, Note, Excessive
Force Claims: Is Significant Bodily Injury the Sine Qua Non to Proving a Fourth Amendment
Violation?, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 739, 751 (1990) (demonstrating that courts have not
uniformly applied Graham’s Fourth Amendment test); Shafer, supra note 110, at 204
(discussing numerous cases regarding the reasonableness test).
115
Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1994).
116
See Grazier ex rel. White v. City of Philadelphia, 328 F.3d 120, 127 (3d Cir. 2003)
(noting the circuit court’s split discussion in Abraham); Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177,
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Circuits assess officer actions under a “totality of the circumstances”
standard, while the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits review
officer actions exactly when the seizure occurs.117 As a result of this
1186–88 (9th Cir. 2002) (addressing the split between the First, Third, Fourth, Sixth,
Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits); Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 291–92 (3d Cir. 1999)
(discussing the court’s agreement with the First Circuit and its disagreement with the
Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits); Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1160–62 (6th
Cir. 1996); St. Hilaire v. City of Laconia, 71 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 1995) (explaining the court’s
disagreement with the Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits); Schulz v. Long, 44 F.3d 643,
649 (8th Cir. 1995) (discussing the court’s agreement with the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and
Tenth Circuits to disregard the events leading up to the seizure).
117
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985). The Third Circuit has determined that the
totality of the circumstances standard set forth in Garner, was again appropriately applied
in Brower. See Abraham, 183 F.3d at 291 (noting that the Court in Brower used the totality of
the circumstances to determine the officer’s reasonableness and concluded that doing so
was appropriate). This standard has been reaffirmed in the Third Circuit through
numerous subsequent cases. See, e.g., Hill v. Nigro, 266 F. App’x 219, 221 (3d Cir. 2008);
Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 207 (3d Cir. 2007); Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 776–77 (3d Cir.
2004); Grazier ex rel. White, 328 F.3d at 127; Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 515 (3d
Cir. 2003). The First Circuit has also determined that the totality of the circumstances
standard set forth by the Supreme Court is the proper analysis. See Young v. City of
Providence, 404 F.3d 4, 22 (1st Cir. 2005); St. Hilaire, 71 F.3d at 26 n.4 (“We do not read this
case as forbidding courts from examining circumstances leading up to a seizure, once it is
established that there has been a seizure.”). The First Circuit also noted that it had previously
made similar decisions in earlier cases. St. Hilaire, 71 F.3d at 26.
Instead of focusing solely on whether the officer who shot Hegarty
was acting in self-defense at the moment of the shooting (Hegarty had
picked up a rifle and raised it in the direction of the officers and
ignored their demands to drop it), the court examined all of the actions
of the officers to determine whether there was probable cause to arrest
Hegarty and whether there were exigent circumstances to allow a
forcible, warrantless, nighttime entry into her dwelling. Id. at 1374–79.
Similarly, in Roy v. Lewiston, this court examined all of the surrounding
circumstances in determining whether the police acted reasonably:
“Roy was armed; he apparently tried to kick and strike at the officers;
he disobeyed repeated instructions to put down the weapons; and the
officers had other reasons . . . for thinking him capable of assault.” 42
F.3d at 695.
Id. 26–27. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has also determined that considering the totality of
the circumstances, not just the moments before the seizure, was appropriate when
considering reasonableness. See Claybrook v. Birchwell, 274 F.3d 1098, 1104–05 (6th Cir.
2001). But see Dickerson, 101 F.3d at 1162 (noting that in “reviewing the plaintiffs' excessive
force claim, we limit the scope of our inquiry to the moments preceding the shooting.”).
The Ninth Circuit has taken a slightly different approach, but nonetheless has concluded
that courts should consider the totality of the circumstances. See Billington, 292 F.3d at 1190
(citing Duran v. City of Maywood, 221 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2000); Alexander v. City &
County of San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1994)) (finding that the initial inquiry
should be whether the officer’s conduct would provoke a violent response, followed by a
determination if such force was objectively reasonable).
In contrast, other courts only consider an officer’s actions at the moment the seizure
occurs. See, e.g., Bella v. Chamberlain, 24 F.3d 1251, 1256 (10th Cir. 1994); Cole v. Bone, 993
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inconsistent standard, many law enforcement departments revised and
altered their active shooter policies.118
C. Law Enforcement’s Response to School Violence
Within days after the Columbine shooting, law enforcement agencies
across the country began scrutinizing and changing their rapid-response
programs.119 These speedy changes were designed to prevent high
F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1993); Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328, 1332 (7th Cir. 1992);
Greenidge v. Ruffin, 927 F.2d 789, 792 (4th Cir. 1991). The Fourth Circuit noted that the
focus of reasonableness must be on the conduct “at the moment when the decision to use
certain force was made” and therefore, “excluding evidence of the officer's actions leading
up to the time immediately prior to the shooting” was appropriate. Greenidge, 927 F.2d at
792 (internal quotations omitted). The Seventh Circuit noted that “pre-seizure conduct is
not subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.” Carter, 973 F.2d at 1332. Similarly, the Eighth
Circuit affirmed this principle when it noted, “we scrutinize only the seizure itself, not the
events leading to the seizure, for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.” Cole, 993
F.3d at 1333 (citing Carter, 973 F.2d at 1332). Two years later the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed
that events leading up to the seizure should not be considered. Schulz, 44 F.3d at 649.
Finally, the Tenth Circuit again adopted this principle when it rejected an appellant’s claim
that the court should examine all of the actions of the police officer up to the seizure. Bella,
24 F.3d at 1256. See also Holland ex rel. Overdorff v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1191 (10th
Cir. 2001) (“The decision to use a SWAT team to make a ‘dynamic entry’ into a residence
constitutes conduct ‘immediately connected with the seizure’ because it determines the
degree of force initially to be applied in effecting the seizure itself.”); Medina v. Cram, 252
F.3d 1124, 1132 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We emphasize, however, that, in order to constitute
excessive force, the conduct arguably creating the need for force must be immediately
connected with the seizure . . . .”); Sevier v. City of Lawrence, 60 F.3d 695, 699 (10th Cir.
1995) (“The reasonableness of Defendants’ actions depends both on whether the officers
were in danger at the precise moment that they used force and on whether Defendants'
own reckless or deliberate conduct during the seizure unreasonably created the need to use
such force.”). But see Allen v. Muskogee, Okla., 119 F.3d 837, 841 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting
that that the officers' conduct prior to the use of force could be included in the
reasonableness inquiry).
118
See infra Part II.C (discussing law enforcement’s response to school violence).
119
See Timothy Harper, Shoot to Kill, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2000, at 28, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2000/10/harper.htm (discussing the Peoria, Illinois
Police Department’s new tactics and noting that most of the nation’s 17000 police agencies,
especially the 2000 agencies with fifty or more officers, have instituted new training
programs in the last year).
The day after Columbine, municipal officials and police chiefs across
the nation asked their SWAT team leaders, “If it had happened here,
what would have been the result?” They received answers similar to
the one that Sergeant Jeff Adams, a longtime SWAT team leader and
trainer in Peoria, gave: “The same thing would have happened here.”
Id. See also Lisa Backus, Shooter Exercises Help Police Sharpen Response (May 25, 2008),
http://www.policeone.com/training/articles/1698404-Shooter-exercises-help-policesharpen-response/ (noting that after the shootings at Columbine, officers cannot wait for
the SWAT team); Shelby County Officers Drill for Potential School Shootings (Apr. 4, 2002),
http://www.policeone.com/training/articles/50373-Shelby-County-Officers-Drill-for-
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casualties in school shootings and to avoid potential wrongful death
lawsuits filed by victims’ families due to officer inaction.120
Consequently, “Columbine almost immediately became a seminal event
in the history of police training and tactics.”121
Part II.C.1 reviews traditional police active shooter policies,
revealing the passivity of traditional policies.122 Conversely, Part II.C.2
discusses the current trend in active-shooter policies and the aggressive
techniques being used to counter school violence.123
1.

Traditional Police Policies

Traditionally, the first officers to respond to an active shooter never
rush into a confrontation.124 Instead, they were trained to secure the area
Potential-School-Shootings/ [hereinafter Shelby County Officers Train] (noting more than
fifty officers in central Indiana, including the Indiana State Police troopers, received this
training).
120
See, e.g., Shoels v. Klebold, 375 F.3d 1054 (10th Cir. 2004); Ireland v. Jefferson County
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 193 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (D. Colo. 2002); Rohrbough v. Stone, 189 F. Supp. 2d
1144 (D. Colo. 2002); Sanders v. Acclaim Entm’t, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (D. Colo. 2002);
Castaldo v. Stone, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Colo. 2001); Rohrbough v. Stone, 189 F. Supp.
2d 1088 (D. Colo. 2001); Ruegsegger v. Jefferson County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 197 F.
Supp. 2d 1247 (D. Colo. 2001); Ruegsegger v. Jefferson County School Dist. R-1, 187 F.
Supp. 2d 1284 (D. Colo. 2001); Sanders v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of County of Jefferson,
192 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D. Colo. 2001); Schnurr v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Jefferson
County, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1105 (D. Colo. 2001); Harris v. Denver Post Corp., 123 P.3d 1166
(Colo. 2005); Blesch v. Denver Pub. Co., 62 P.3d 1060 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002); Bodelson v.
Denver Pub. Co., 5 P.3d 373 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000). See also Harper, supra note 119 (“Glick
acknowledges that the fear of lawsuits is one factor behind the new tactics.”); Wallentine,
supra note 80 (noting tremendous potential liability comes with each use of force); Ron
Avery, Tactical Decision Making: An Equation for Critical Thinking in Moments of Crisis
(May 9, 2007), http://www.policeone.com/training/articles/1243796-Tactical-decisionmaking-An-equation-for-critical-thinking-in-moments-of-crisis/ (posing the question
“How often is legal liability the overwhelming factor in decision making, to the exclusion
of situational needs or overall mission?”). Schools may also be subject to liability for
student deaths. See Brett A. Sokolow et al., College and University Liability for Violent Campus
Attacks, 34 J.C. & U.L. 319 (2008); Ben “Ziggy” Williamson, Note, The Gunslinger to the Ivory
Tower Came: Should Universities Have a Duty to Prevent Rampage Killings?, 60 FLA. L. REV.
895, 898 (2008) (discussing “whether universities should have a duty to identify and thwart
students that pose a threat to the lives of other students” and “ultimately reject[ing] the
application of a Tarasoff-like duty to protect in the context of university rampage killings”).
121
Harper, supra note 119.
122
See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing traditional police policies regarding school shootings).
123
See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing contemporary police policies regarding school
shootings).
124
See Harper, supra note 119 (“The traditional police response was designed for dealing
with trapped bank robbers, angry husbands, or disgruntled employees—not with
disaffected teenagers running through a school killing as many people as possible.”); Todd
Johnson, Milwaukee Police Department Tactical Enforcement Team: Patrol Response to the
Active Shooter Instructor Manual 2 (unpublished manual, on file with The Valparaiso
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by establishing a perimeter around the scene to contain the suspect.125
Meanwhile, SWAT teams were notified.126 Upon arrival, the SWAT
teams were given command over the situation, and all tactical operations
were under their authority.127 Even if an officer did enter the building
and came upon the suspect holding a gun to a hostage’s head, they were
taught to comply with the suspect’s demands.128 Now, however, with
the pressures of litigation and continuing violence in schools, many
officers are being trained to use tactics, typically reserved for specialists,
in an attempt to neutralize the risk quickly.129
University Law Review) [hereinafter MPD Training Manual] (stating that traditional
methods were focused on isolating and containing the suspect).
125
See Backus, supra note 119 (revealing that traditional methods consisted of setting up a
perimeter and waiting for the SWAT team to arrive); Harper, supra note 119.
126
See Harper, supra note 119.
127
See id. “The SWAT team arrived, assumed positions to keep the suspects pinned
down, and negotiated with them until they surrendered. SWAT teams stormed buildings
only when necessary to save lives, such as when hostages were being executed one by
one.” Id.
128
See Harper, supra note 119. “When he came upon the suspect holding the gun to the
hostage’s head, Layman’s initial impulse was to drop his gun. ‘That’s what you were
always taught—drop the gun, just like on the TV shows[.]’” Id.
129
See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing new police policies to neutralize the risk). But see Mike
Baird, Texas Police are Taught When to Use Deadly Force: Officers Learn to Use Guns at Last
Resort, Nov. 24, 2003, http://www.policeone.com/training/articles/72870-Texas-PoliceAre-Taught-When-to-Use-Deadly-Force/ (discussing training requirements for Corpus
Christi police officers and noting that officer training should focus on decision-making and
teaching officers that deciding when to use deadly force is just as important as teaching
them when not to use it). However, this decision-making skill is difficult to attain when
officers have minimal training requirements and do not comply with national standards.
See Backus, supra note 119 (noting that officers only spent four hours participating in active
shooter situations and all the police departments will have to participate in the four hour
training); Lise Olsen & Cindy George, Houston Police Training Faces More Changes, June 2,
2008, http://www.policeone.com/training/articles/1700712-Houston-police-training-faces
-more-changes/ (stating that the Houston Police Department requires officers to use the
firing range once a year, the state’s minimum requirement, other larger cities require two
attendances per year, and the national guidelines mandate four times per year; therefore, if
officers would like additional training they must purchase their own ammunition and
“compete for range time”).
Interestingly, one of the side effects of these new tactics is increased levels of stress.
See First Shot Hits, supra note 14 (discussing the effects of stress on a police officer’s
competency to react to his surroundings); New Findings About Simulation Training and PostShooting Interview Stress, Jan. 2, 2007, http://www.policeone.com/writers/columnists/
force-science/articles/1197958/ [hereinafter New Findings about Stress] (noting the effects
stressful situations have upon memory).
We all know that excessive stress affects the awareness sections of the
brain negatively, and the expected performance deteriorates rapidly in
relation to the stress level experienced. The subconscious mind on the
other hand will instantly increase its perceptive ability under stress,
like when under live fire, and work hundreds of times faster than the
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Contemporary Police Policies

Although SWAT teams may still be used, the current objective of
thousands of police departments across the country is to neutralize the
shooter.130 Rather than establish a perimeter and secure the area, the first
four to five officers on the scene form a “contact team.”131 Once

awareness sections of the brain. The subconscious mind will also,
whether we want so or not, override any previous behavior pattern or
training stored in the awareness section of the brain when under
extreme stress. This means that any training of the awareness sections
of the brain will more or less be non-existent when the subconscious
mind takes over in a live shoot-out.
First Shot Hits, supra note 14.
130
See Harper, supra note 119 (“Their sole purpose is to move right to the shooter and
stop him, using whatever force is necessary,” and are instructed to “take the shot if you
have it.”) (internal quotations omitted); Shelby County Officers Train, supra note 119 (“The
quicker you can get in there and neutralize the situation, the better.”) (internal quotations
omitted); City of Racine Police Department Policy and Procedure, Rapid Deployment
Policy 1 (June 8, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Valparaiso University
Law Review) [hereinafter RPD Policy] (noting the purpose is “to safe guard innocent
individuals who otherwise may suffer great bodily injury or death without immediate
police intervention.”); MPD Training Manual, supra note 124, at 1 (stating that the objective
is to “[s]uccessfully perform proper team movement and room clearing techniques while
moving rapidly through the facility in an effort to locate, isolate, or engage the ‘Active
Shooter.’”). Whereas in the past SWAT experts were trained to neutralize the shooter, now
police officers “are being taught to enter a building if they are the first to arrive at the
scene, to chase the gunman, and to kill or disable him as quickly as possible.” Harper,
supra note 119.
131
See RPD Policy, supra note 130, at 1 (discussing the proper procedure upon receiving a
complaint). The officer involved should perform the following duties:
1.
Advise the Communications of the current status of the situation
until relieved by a Supervisor. Attempt to confirm the situation
as an Active Shooter situation.
2.
Attempt to confine and/or contain the situation until additional
support arrives.
3.
As directed by the on-scene Supervisor become a member of the
following;
a. Contact Team.
b. Search and Rescue Team.
c. Security Team.
4.
Attempt to effect the arrest(s) necessary as part of your duties as
assigned by the on-scene Supervisor.
Id. See also Burdi, supra note 14 (discussing traditional methods, including establishing a
perimeter, and the modern trend of officers being trained to actually “confront or diffuse a
violent situation”); Harper, supra note 119; Ohio Trainer Makes the Case for Single-Officer
Entry Against Active Killers, May 14, 2008, http://www.policeone.com/writers/
columnists/Force-Science/articles/1695125-Ohio-trainer-makes-the-case-for-single-officerentry-against-active-killers/ [hereinafter Single-Officer Entry Against Active Killer] (noting
that an assembly of three or more officers is recommended, but also advocating for single-
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assembled, they enter into a diamond formation and move through the
school quickly, searching for the shooter and ignoring wounded
individuals.132 When contact is made with the shooter, officers are to
disable the shooter by any means necessary, regardless of hostages.133
The main concern in these situations is time.134 The theory is that by
having the contact team pursue the gunman, he will be under pressure
to keep moving, thus preventing him from controlling a particular
populated area and killing many people.135 Moreover, the gunman’s
attention will be diverted to the officers, and innocent bystanders will be
protected.136
In conclusion, school violence plagues American schools, despite
numerous attempts by Congress, schools, and states to reduce it.137

officer entries); Shelby County Officers Train, supra note 119 (stating that this training will
teach officers arriving on the scene how to react).
In addition to aggressive techniques, the Indianapolis Police Department has issued
twenty of their officers M-16 Rifles. See Indy Police Train to Use M-16 Rifles, Dec. 1, 2004,
http://www.policeone.com/training/articles/94089-Indy-Police-Train-to-Use-M-16Rifles/ [hereinafter Indy Police Use M-16 Rifles]. The police department reasons that doing
so will give officers more options when faced with specific situations in which such
weaponry could be used. Id.
132
See Harper, supra note 119 (noting that a second diamond formation may be used in
larger buildings; one team pursuing the shooter and the other rescuing bystanders and
wounded); MPD Training Manual, supra note 124, at 4, 12–16 (noting the first priority is to
“locate, isolate, capture and/or neutralization of the suspect, as soon as possible” and
discussing the proper formations). However, at least one other police department uses a Tformation, which consists of three officers across the front and one in the rear. See Backus,
supra note 119.
133
Harper, supra note 119 (noting that police departments are training officers to shoot
because if they do not, the hostage is likely to die regardless). “Most of the gunman’s body
was shielded by the hostage, but Layman did not hesitate. He took the shot. Blue paint
exploded against the gunman’s helmet. . . . His clean head shot ended the exercise.” Id.
However, before shooting, experts suggest officers consider lighting conditions, whether
the subject is moving or standing still, distance, whether the sights on the firearm have
been sighted in recently, how “fat” the front sight is, the type of position the officer is in,
time pressures, what is behind the target in case of a miss, and whether the officer is
stationary or moving. Avery, supra note 120.
134
See Harper, supra note 119 (noting it typically takes three to four minutes for officers to
arrive on the scene, while it takes on average thirty to sixty minutes for a SWAT team to
organize and arrive); Paul Howe, Officer Survival:
Use-of-Force (Dec. 1, 2007),
http://www.policeone.com/policemarksman/32-6/1667745-Officer-Survival-Use-ofForce/ (noting that in large cities, SWAT teams may take thirty to forty minutes to respond
to an emergency; thus police officers “need to be authorized and empowered to act, and
their training levels need to be elevated to meet the threats that they face”).
135
Harper, supra note 119 (noting that the Columbine shooters seized the school library
and were able to kill and wound most of their victims).
136
See id. (“[G]unmen are less likely to fire at innocent bystanders if they are shooting at
pursuing police officers.”).
137
See supra Part II.A (discussing the current trends in school violence).
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Although most remedies promote safety by providing additional
funding to participating schools that comply with safety standards,
many of these remedies have failed.138 Coupled with the threat of
litigation for inaction, police departments have been forced to change
their active shooter policies.139 While the public has generally been
receptive of these new policies, these policies have not yet been
challenged and could lead to excessive force claims if an officer acts
unreasonably.140 Because of the inconsistencies among appellate courts
and the imprecise nature of reasonableness, police officers could act
unreasonably.141
III. ANALYSIS
While congressional acts, state statutes, schools, and police
departments have tried to remedy school shootings or provide police
officers guidance, courts have rarely assisted.142
Instead, police
departments have been left with an ambiguous reasonableness test and
little direction on how to apply it in school environments.143 As a result,
they have created unclear policies that may infringe upon the shooter’s
rights.144 In order to protect these police departments from liability and
deter school violence, courts need to create a bright-line rule that gives
greater deference to police departments responding to school
shootings.145 This is particularly important because previously proposed
alternatives have proven inadequate.146
Part III.A analyzes the problems with previous approaches taken to
remedy school violence.147 Part III.B examines the problems with

138
See supra notes 54–63 and accompanying text (discussing surveys revealing security
continued problems at schools).
139
See supra note 120 and accompanying text (noting cases where police departments
were sued).
140
See Harper, supra note 119. “So far rapid-response training has encountered little
public opposition, but Klinger expects that will change the first time the police kill a
suspect instead of capturing him, or the first time an officer firing at a suspect hits an
innocent person instead.” Id.
141
See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the inconsistent application of the reasonableness test
among lower courts).
142
See supra Part II.A (discussing actions taken by these entities).
143
See supra Part III.B (setting forth the background of the reasonableness test).
144
See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing contemporary police policies).
145
See infra Parts III.A–C (discussing problems with previous remedies and the inherent
problems with the current reasonableness test).
146
See supra Part II.A (discussing congressional acts, state statutes, and school remedies).
147
See infra Part III.A (discussing the problems with previous attempts to remedy school
violence).
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applying a reasonableness test.148 Finally, Part III.C considers the
problems posed by new nationwide police policies.149
A. Problem 1: Previous Approaches to Remedy School Violence Are Too
Preventative
At least four authoritative entities have attempted to remedy school
violence by proposing and implementing legislation or strict policies.150
These bodies include: Congress, state legislatures, schools, and other
governmental agencies, such as the FBI, Secret Service, and Department
of Education.151 The remedies posed by these organizations are
individually flawed, but the common underlying defect is the
preventative nature of the remedies.152
Congress has attempted to address school violence through multiple
congressional bills and statutes, many of which provide additional
financial aid to schools implementing security measures.153 Because
many of Congress’s attempts were proposed by leading national
organizations and were preventative, they lack a substantial deterrent
mechanism.154 Strong deterrents are essential because preventative
measures may deter small risks, but they will not discourage individuals
determined to evade those measures.155
In fact, without strong
See infra Part III.B (discussing the problems the reasonableness test creates innately,
for officers, and for courts).
149
See infra Part III.C (discussing the problems the contemporary police policies create).
150
See supra Part II.A (discussing previous proposals to remedy school violence and their
ineffectiveness).
151
See supra Part II.A (discussing previously proposed remedies).
152
See supra notes 29–49, 54–63 and accompanying text; infra notes 153–73 and
accompanying text (discussing the faults of previous remedies).
153
See supra notes 30–36 and accompanying text (discussing the statutes Congress has
passed and the bills proposed by congressmen).
154
See supra note 29 (noting two national organizations lobbying and petitioning in
Congress).
155
See Maxwell, supra note 2. “Mr. Thomas acknowledged that keeping a determined,
armed intruder out of schools may be impossible . . . .” Id. However,
Mr. Cornell of the University of Virginia, who advises school
administrators on security issues, cautioned policymakers and
educators against measures to “fortify” schools, such as installing
metal detectors and hiring police or armed security officers to patrol
them. Those features tend to become more a pacifier than a panacea,
he said. “That should be the last resort,” he said. “Remember, in the
school shooting at [Red Lake Indian Reservation in Minnesota], the
first person to get shot was the school security officer.”
Id. Moreover, the Luke Woodham, a sixteen-year-old student gunman told a federal
education official “in an interview that a metal detector or police officer on duty would not
have stopped his rampage.” Id. See also 2002 NASRO SURVEY, supra note 58, at 7 (noting
the ability to gain access to schools is easy).
148
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deterrents the likelihood of school shootings might increase because
schools become easy targets.156 Similar to congressional statutes, state
legislation has been too preventative in nature.157
Preventative measures created by state legislation are faulty because
increasing penalties for weapons on school grounds reduces only the
occurrence of firearms on school grounds, not violence on school
grounds.158 Similar to congressional statutes, state zoning laws make
schools more vulnerable because perpetrators, believing the school is
unarmed, become more inclined to attack.159 While arming teachers with
concealed weapons has received mixed reviews by parents and school
officials, it provides a defense and deterrent against perpetrators.160 This
leads to the implementation of prevention-oriented strategies by the
third entity—schools.161
Schools typically use zero-tolerance policies to threaten and prevent
school violence.162
While reactionary, these policies resemble
preventative measures created by congressional and state zoning laws.163
156
See Texas School District OKs Pistols for Staff, supra note 49 (noting it was not until the
federal government starting making schools gun-free zones that these types of school
shootings have started to occur). In order to prevent the school from being an easy target,
one school district has approved teachers to carry firearms. Id.
157
See infra notes 158–61 and accompanying text (discussing the problems with state
legislation).
158
See supra notes 38–43 and accompanying text (discussing examples of state statutes
implemented to deter weapon possession on school grounds). See also Maxwell, supra note
2 (noting that fortifying schools with metal detectors and enhanced security will only act as
a “pacifier [rather] than a panacea”).
159
This was the logic of one school district in Texas that allowed teachers to carry
concealed weapons if they were certified and passed all the requirements established by
the school district. See Texas School District OKs Pistols for Staff, supra note 49; Texas Students
Pack Bookbags; Teachers Pack Heat, supra note 48. “When you outlaw guns in a certain area,
the only people who follow that are law-abiding citizens, and everybody else ignores it[.]”
Texas Students Pack Bookbags; Teachers Pack Heat, supra note 48. A similar logic was behind
the 500 colleges and universities across the country that have purchased training programs
teaching professors and students to fight back with improvised weapons, such as a
backpack or laptop computer. See Zagier, supra note 48 (noting that the training teaches
students to be aware of surroundings and to use laptops or backpacks as weapons).
160
See Texas Students Pack Bookbags; Teachers Pack Heat, supra note 48 (parent commenting
that with the length of time it takes for police to arrive, arming teachers at least provides
some sort of defense).
161
See infra notes 162–67 and accompanying text (discussing the problems school
programs create).
162
See supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text (discussing prevalence of zero-tolerance
policies).
163
Compare supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text (discussing zero-tolerance policies
and the preventative nature to deter weapon possession), with supra notes 30–36 and
accompanying text (discussing Congress’s school zoning laws, punishments imposed upon
students, and safety requirements imposed upon schools receiving federal financial aid, all
of which are intended to deter and prevent school violence), and supra notes 37–43 and
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School policies are impractical because they impose small punishments
on students and do not deter students who intend to commit violent
acts.164 In other words, they only deter gun possession and not the active
use of that gun.165 In addition, they also share the same over-inclusive,
inflexible, and ineffective characteristics exhibited in threat assessment
programs.166 With regard to deterrence, zero-tolerance policies fall
between proposed legislation and the threat assessment programs
created by the FBI, Secret Service, and Department of Education.167
The FBI, Secret Service, and Department of Education threat
assessment programs provide weak deterrents because they attack
school violence only indirectly and have a high risk of error.168 Their
over-inclusiveness and high-risk tendencies stem from misidentifying
the risky behaviors, the rarity of such events, and the low predictability
of similar future events.169 While assessing threats are important in
determining initial security measures, the costs and risks of wrongly
accusing someone are great, particularly when numerous factors and
multiple types of threats are taken into consideration.170 As a result,
accompanying text (discussing state school zoning laws and varying punishments imposed
upon violators, which are intended to deter and prevent school violence).
164
See supra notes 30–43, 54–63 and accompanying text (noting the punishments imposed
upon violators and the survey results indicating the ineffectiveness of such measures).
165
See supra note 155 and accompanying text (noting at least one student who admitted a
metal detector or police officers would not have deterred his actions).
166
Compare Armistead, supra note 44 (noting that non-negotiable punishment can be
inappropriate and ineffective because “[p]ossession of a butter knife and possession of a
switchblade . . . automatically receive the same punishment”), and supra notes 45–49 and
accompanying text (discussing problems with zero-tolerance in schools and the tendency
to be over-inclusive and speculative), with infra notes 168, 170 and accompanying text
(discussing the FBI, Secret Service, and Department of Education’s threat assessment
factors and the speculative nature of checklists).
167
Compare supra notes 30–43 and accompanying text (discussing proposed legislation by
Congress and states and the strong preventative nature of these measures), with infra notes
168–71 and accompanying text (discussing the unreliable and high risk characteristics).
168
See generally FEIN ET AL., supra note 12; O’TOOLE, supra note 28, at 2; POLLACK ET AL.,
supra note 28; VOSSEKUIL ET AL., supra note 28.
One response to the pressure for action may be an effort to
identify the next shooter by developing a “profile” of the typical school
shooter. This may sound like a reasonable preventative measure, but
in practice, trying to draw up a catalogue or “checklist” of warning
signs to detect a potential school shooter can be shortsighted, even
dangerous. Such lists, publicized by the media, can end up unfairly
labeling many nonviolent students as potentially dangerous or even
lethal.
O’TOOLE, supra note 28, at 2.
169
See O’TOOLE, supra note 28, at 2–3.
170
See id. See also supra notes 29, 168 and accompanying text (discussing factors to
consider and the risk of over-inclusiveness). Moreover,
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threat assessments are the weakest deterrent because they are
disconnected from school violence and provide a complex, fact-sensitive
calculation.171
Despite problems with preventative measures, they are useful
because school violence is often a conglomeration of factors for which a
single solution does not exist.172 Imprisonment, police action, and police
presence may still be the greatest deterrents available, but imposing a
reasonableness test in school shootings is problematic.173
B. Problem 2: Interpreting and Applying the Reasonableness Test
Police officers are charged with enforcing the law, and traditionally
courts give them deference.174 However, § 1983 limits police officers’ use
of force and holds them accountable to a reasonableness standard.175
Under the current test, an individual must establish the two-prongs set
[t]hreats can be classed in four categories: direct, indirect, veiled, or
conditional. A direct threat identifies a specific act against a specific
target and is delivered in a straightforward, clear, and explicit manner:
“I am going to place a bomb in the school’s gym.” An indirect threat
tends to be vague, unclear, and ambiguous. The plan, the intended
victim, the motivation, and other aspects of the threat are masked or
equivocal: “If I wanted to, I could kill everyone at this school!” While
violence is implied, the threat is phrased tentatively—“If I wanted to”
—and suggests that a violent act COULD occur, not that it WILL occur.
A veiled threat is one that strongly implies but does not explicitly
threaten violence. “We would be better off without you around
anymore” clearly hints at a possible violent act, but leaves it to the
potential victim to interpret the message and give a definite meaning
to the threat. A conditional threat is the type of threat often seen in
extortion cases. It warns that a violent act will happen unless certain
demands or terms are met: “If you don’t pay me one million dollars, I
will place a bomb in the school.”
O’TOOLE, supra note 28, at 7.
171
See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text (discussing the weaknesses of threat
assessment).
172
Just as threats cannot be resolved by a single solution, governing bodies are correct in
not applying a single solution to resolve school violence. If this did happen, then they
would blindly follow the fallacy created by “Abraham Maslow: ‘If the only tool you have
is a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a nail.’ Every problem is not a nail, of
course, and schools must recognize that every threat does not represent the same danger or
require the same level of response.” O’TOOLE, supra note 28, at 5.
173
See generally 2004 NASRO SURVEY, supra note 58; 2003 NASRO SURVEY, supra note 58;
2002 NASRO SURVEY, supra note 58; 2001 NASRO SURVEY, supra note 54 (discussing how
threats have continued to persist). See also infra Part III.B.2 (discussing problems for officers
in applying reasonableness).
174
See supra Parts II.B.1–2 (discussing the evolution of police action from the common
law to the reasonableness test).
175
See supra note 16 for text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See also supra Part II.B (defining excessive
force).
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forth in Graham.176 Despite the test’s apparent clarity, it is actually
convoluted and poses problems for lower courts and police officers.177
Part III.B.1 analyzes the problems with the imprecise reasonableness
test set forth by the Supreme Court.178 Part III.B.2 discusses the problems
this creates for police officers.179 Part III.B.3 considers the problems
facing lower courts.180
1.

The Reasonableness Test

First defined in Tennessee v. Garner,181 the reasonableness test
provided that if an officer had probable cause to believe the suspect
posed a threat of serious physical harm to officers or others, deadly force
was reasonable to prevent escape.182 This test was expanded in Graham
v. Connor.183 Whereas Garner was a narrow holding, only applying to
cases where individuals posed danger while fleeing, Graham expanded
the standard to all excessive force claims.184 Graham impliedly became
the standard, with Garner as an illustration of that standard, but not until
Scott v. Harris185 did such notions come to fruition.186

See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text (discussing the two-prong test
established in Graham, which asks whether a seizure occurred, and if so, whether the acts
were reasonable). This Note does not discuss the first prong of the test; whether a seizure
has occurred. See supra notes 94–101 (discussing the second prong and the Court’s decision
in greater detail).
177
See infra Parts III.B.1–3 (discussing the innate problems with the reasonableness test,
the problems this creates for police officers during school shootings, and the problems this
creates for lower courts).
178
See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the innate problems with the reasonableness test).
179
See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the problems a reasonableness test creates for police
officers during school shootings).
180
See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing the problems this creates for lower courts).
181
471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).
182
See supra note 89 and accompanying text (quoting the language used by the Court).
183
490 U.S. 386 (1989). See supra notes 94–101 and accompanying text (discussing the
reasonableness standard).
184
Compare Garner, 471 U.S. at 22 (noting that the statute was not invalid on its face, and
was only invalid with the acts purportedly authorized in this case), with Graham, 490 U.S. at
388 (holding that any claim brought against a law enforcement official in the “course of
making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of his person[,]” had to be analyzed
under the Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness test). See also George, supra note 87,
at 146 (noting the Court took a narrow view and approach in Tennessee v. Garner).
185
550 U.S. 372 (2007).
186
See infra notes 187–208 and accompanying text (discussing the
distinguishing of Scott and Garner).
176
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Scott dramatically changed the relatively clear reasonableness
definition.187 In Scott, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion attacked the
notion that Garner was “the test” for reasonable deadly force with regard
to a fleeing suspect.188 Justice Scalia explained “that several of Garner’s
preconditions for deadly force [were] merely an application of the
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness inquiry and not a ‘magical on/off
switch that triggers rigid preconditions whenever an officer’s actions
constitute deadly force.’”189 As a result, Garner is not the test, but rather
an example of the reasonableness test.190 The Court distinguished Scott
from Garner and distanced it from Graham.191
Graham has been thrust to the forefront in determining the
reasonableness of a police officer’s actions.192 As such, it would have
been logical for the Court in Scott to discuss Graham.193 However, the
Court did not apply Graham, signaling a distancing from that
precedent.194 Instead, the Court focused primarily upon the cost-benefit
analysis of the officer’s actions, coupled with the perpetrator’s
culpability and danger posed to bystanders.195 This further indicates
distancing because it implies that police officers and courts must
consider a fourth factor, dangerousness, whereas Graham only discussed
three.196
This cost-benefit analysis is relatively new to Fourth
187
See generally George, supra note 87, at 148 (arguing Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in
Scott was a direct attack on the standard set forth in Garner, while ignoring the standards
set forth in Graham).
188
Id. Justice Scalia factually distinguished Garner and Scott primarily on the danger
posed to bystanders. See id.
189
Id. (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)) (internal quotations omitted).
190
See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (“Garner was
simply an application of the Fourth Amendment’s ‘reasonableness’ test”)); George, supra note
87, at 148 (noting that Scott reduced Garner to little more than an example).
191
See supra notes 75–77, 94; infra notes 192–208 and accompanying text (discussing the
distinguishing between Scott and Graham).
192
See supra note 94 and accompanying text (noting Graham’s applicability to all excessive
force cases). See also George, supra note 87, at 149 n.18 (noting that “Graham purported to
apply to all use-of-force cases, with which Garner specifically did not deal”).
193
See George, supra note 87, at 145, 149 n.18 (noting that it was surprising that the Court
did not discuss, let alone not apply Graham v. Connor).
194
See generally Scott, 550 U.S. 372 (only noting that Graham stood for the proposition that
a violation of the Fourth Amendment must be based upon objective reasonableness). See
also George, supra note 87, at 149 n.18 (suggesting the avoidance of applying Graham
equates to a distancing of Scott and Graham).
195
See Scott, 550 U.S. at 384–85.
196
Compare George, supra note 87, at 149 (proposing and noting that “for all future cases
the door is now open to a new conception of dangerousness, under which a court may no
longer ignore dangerousness from flight as a Fourth Amendment reasonableness factor”),
with Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (noting that reasonableness “requires
careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the
severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety
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Amendment analysis.197 Because Scott did not discuss Garner or Graham,
and instead carved out its own independent rule granting greater
deference to police officers, it appears that the Court has started to revert
back to common law notions.198
As previously noted, under common law, officers were allowed to
commit any and all necessary actions to prevent a felon from escaping.199
Garner contradicted this by carving out an exception, which provided
that officers could not use deadly force to merely detain a felon, but Scott
reverts by adopting that any police actions are justified if the suspected
felon is dangerous.200 In adopting this position, there are very few
situations where a suspected felon could be seen as non-dangerous,
especially when the Court agreed the “paramount governmental
interest” was ensuring public safety.201
The Court also used
dangerousness to justify no requirement for alternative methods.202
By rejecting the alternative means argument, police officers were
given greater deference because they can use all the force that is

of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
arrest by flight”).
197
Compare Scott, 550 U.S. at 384–85, and George, supra note 87, at 151 (noting that “the
question of when deadly force should be used is a matter of policy, beyond the question of
what is permissible under the Fourth Amendment”), with Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (noting
the three factors to be used in determining reasonableness without noting culpability or the
benefits to society), and Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (focusing only on the
costs and threats to police officers and innocent bystanders without considering culpability
or the benefits afforded to society).
198
See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text (discussing the common law standard
for the use of force). See also infra notes 199–208 and accompanying text (discussing the
implicit reversion back to the common law standard).
199
See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text (discussing the common law standard
for the use of force).
200
Compare Garner, 471 U.S. at 12–14 (rejecting the government’s contention that officer’s
should be judged under the common law officers and use “whatever force was necessary to
effect the arrest of a fleeing felon,” while also rejecting the old policy that fleeing felons
were dangerous), with Scott, 550 U.S. at 384 (noting that Harris posed “an actual and
imminent threat to the lives of any pedestrians who might have been present, to other
civilian motorists, and to the officers involved in the chase”).
201
Scott, 550 U.S. at 384. See George, supra note 87, at 146 (“[T]here is no such thing as a
completely nondangerous [sic] fleeing suspect, because even nondangerous [sic] people are
capable of becoming quite dangerous when desperately trying to escape.”). Moreover,
“[s]ociologists have noted that flight-induced panic can cause seemingly harmless people
to set aside social norms in order to escape harm, including, for example, parents who
abandon young children to escape a life threatening crisis.” Id. at 147 (citing E. L.
Quarentelli, The Sociology of Panic, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 11021 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., 2002).
202
See Scott, 550 U.S. at 384–85 (noting that officers did not have to justify not using
alternative means because of the dangerous actions occurring); infra notes 203–07 and
accompanying text (discussing the use of alternative methods and hoping for the best).
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necessary and “certain to eliminate the risk[.]”203 By using this language,
the Court again reverted to common law because many types of force
may be certain to eliminate the risk, including less intrusive means, but
those are not required under the analysis.204 This contradicts Garner
because Garner impliedly required the use of less restrictive means and
rejected common law arguments offered by the government.205
Consequently, the Court claims reasonableness was used, but in reality,
common law principles were applied.206 As a result, police officers may
have difficulty assessing their actions during school shootings.207
2.

Problems for Police Officers in Applying Reasonableness

Police officers applying the aforementioned reasonableness test may
encounter problems because of time constraints; a constant, rapidly
changing environment; and differing individual reasonableness
standards—that is, each officer has his own perception of
reasonableness, thus creating a lack of uniformity.208
Although the Court recognized that officers are under time
constraints, the reasonableness test’s numerous factors are problematic

Scott, 550 U.S. at 384–85 (emphasis added in original).
Compare Garner, 471 U.S. at 12 (noting that under the common law rule, officers were
“allowed the use of whatever force was necessary to effect the arrest of a fleeing felon,
though not a misdemeanant”), and id. at 12 (“As stated in Hale’s posthumously published
Pleas of the Crown: ‘[I]f persons that are pursued by these officers for felony or the just
suspicion thereof . . . shall not yield themselves to these officers, but shall either resist or
fly before they are apprehended or being apprehended shall rescue themselves and resist
or fly, so that they cannot be otherwise apprehended, and are upon necessity slain therein,
because they cannot be otherwise taken, it is no felony.’ 2 M. Hale, Historia Placitorum
Coronae 85 (1736).”) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *289)), with Scott,
550 U.S. at 383–85 (finding the officer’s actions justified and “certain to eliminate the risk”).
205
See Garner, 471 U.S. at 12–16. The Court noted that when the common law rule was
created, all felonies were punishable by death, whereas today many felonies are not. Id. at
13. Moreover, the common law developed when the weapons were rudimentary, and
therefore deadly force was safer than hand-to-hand combat. Id. at 14. As a result of these
policies, the Court rejected the government’s contentions, and instead, impliedly adopted
the position that alternatives should have been used or even the perpetrator’s escape
would have been better. Id. at 11.
206
Compare Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (noting the reasonableness test
should be applied to all excessive force claims), and Garner, 471 U.S. at 3 (applying the
reasonableness test and impliedly requiring the use of alternative methods before deadly
force), with Scott, 550 U.S. at 383–85 (finding the officer’s actions reasonable, although
deferring to his actions and allowing him to use any force “certain to eliminate the risk,”
without the requirement of alternatives).
207
See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing problems officers encounter when a convoluted
reasonableness test is used).
208
See infra notes 209–30 and accompanying text (discussing problems for officers).
203
204
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in these situations.209 Rather than creating a bright-line rule like the rule
in Scott, officers must weigh the three factors set forth in Graham and the
fourth factor added by Scott.210 While many officers may reach the same
conclusions about the proper amount of force, any time a balancing test
exists, there is a chance of error or worse yet, indecision and hesitation,
which can lead to death.211
To remedy these time pressures, the Court previously noted that
police actions must be judged from the officer’s viewpoint when the
seizure occurs; not with 20/20 hindsight.212
While helpful in
determining reasonableness and giving greater deference to police

209
See Scott, 550 U.S. at 384–85 (noting that officers must make split-second decisions,
therefore they need a sensible and easy to apply rule); Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (recognizing
that officers must make split-second decisions); Jensen, supra note 99, at 1280 (“[E]very
police officer must perform what becomes a complex balancing test in the seconds before
each decision to pursue.”); Swartz, supra note 99 (officers have to make difficult splitsecond decisions with no time for real deliberation).
210
See generally Scott, 550 U.S. at 382–83, (noting that dangerousness was an important
factor); Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (discussing three factors the Court must consider in
determining all reasonableness inquiries under Fourth Amendment excessive force claims).
See also George, supra note 87, at 151 (proposing that the Court has adopted a
dangerousness factor that must be included in determinations of reasonableness, and
noting that “Scott v. Harris is an important step towards recognizing that this danger from
flight can be equally relevant to a reasonableness calculation as the danger from continued
freedom.”).
211
See Baird, supra note 129 (“[E]ach deadly force incident is different and the force
continuum is only a guide that combines with an officer’s level of training, education[,] and
experience on the streets. . . . At some point there’s a realization of risk, and hesitancy on
the part of some officers has cost them their lives.”).
212
See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–22 (1968)) (noting
that courts must judge the actions from the perspective of the reasonable officer on the
scene, “rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight”). The Court noted that since the
proper test is an objectively reasonable test, “[a]n officer’s evil intentions will not make a
Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an
officer’s good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional.” Id.
at 397 (citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978); United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218 (1973)). Thus, “[t]hat test [Johnson v. Glick test], which requires consideration of
whether the individual officers acted in ‘good faith’ or ‘maliciously and sadistically for the
very purpose of causing harm,’ is incompatible with a proper Fourth Amendment
analysis.” Id. at 397. See also Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978) (“[I]n
evaluating alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment the Court has first undertaken an
objective assessment of an officer's actions”); Troupe v. Sarasota County, 419 F.3d 1160,
1166–67 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Force regardless of the form directed to a driver . . . does not give
rise to a due process deprivation claim unless it was exercised with ‘a purpose to cause
harm’ unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest.”).
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officers, it will not remedy indecision or hesitation.213 A constant,
rapidly changing environment can also lead to similar problems.214
Balancing tests are detrimental to officers in constant, rapidly
changing environments because each time the situation changes, the
officer must reassess his actions.215 This is dangerous in quickly evolving
situations where officers cannot keep up with reassessments because
hesitation can lead to unreasonable actions and even death.216 Stress can
also hinder a police officer’s reassessment abilities.217
Stress can cause officers to become unresponsive and forget their
surroundings.218 If an officer becomes unresponsive and has a singletrack mind in an evolving situation, he may act unreasonably because
See supra note 211 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of indecision or
hesitation and noting the deadly consequences, which, of course, cannot be reversed
because once somebody is dead, nothing can bring them back to life).
214
See infra notes 215–17 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of rapidly
changing events).
215
Although the following is only an example of a training exercise, it is representative of
how quickly a school shooting can evolve and change.
His ears ringing from gunfire, his uniform damp with sweat, his breath
labored and acrid-tasting from the gunpowder in the air, Officer Larry
Layman ran heavily down a hallway toward an insistent pop-pop-pop.
A gunman was running through a school shooting children, and
Layman was chasing him. Layman rounded a corner, holding his gun
in front of him with two stiff arms, and stopped dead. The gunman
stood facing him, with an arm around a hostage's neck and a gun held
to the hostage's head. “Drop your gun or I'll blow his head off!” the
gunman screamed. Layman, a police officer for more than half his fifty
years, had been trained always to drop his gun at a moment like this.
Now he fired.
Harper, supra note 119. Although courts grant deference to police officers in these
situations, they must still attempt to reassess the reasonableness of their actions. See
Graham, 490 U.S. at 395–99. If this was not expected of officers, then the Court would not
have adopted a balancing test that is subject to change if the facts change, but rather could
have adopted a mechanical rule. Id. See also PATRICK, supra note 63, at 97 (noting that
officers “must continuously assess the actions of the subject and the effects of the force
being used to decide whether the next step on the ladder can be taken. The officers must
also continuously consider lesser alternatives of force to know when to de-escalate.”).
216
See KINNAIRD, supra note 64, at ix (proposing for the implementation of simple tests in
deadly force situations); Baird, supra note 129 (suggesting that as a situation evolves or
changes the amount of appropriate force also changes, noting that “each deadly force
incident is different and the force continuum is only a guide that combines with an officer’s
level of training, education[,] and experience”). But see Avery, supra note 120 (noting good
officers can use balancing tests almost subconsciously and will have refined critical
thinking skills, but suggesting that those without practice or experience may be slower in
assessing situations). See also supra note 211 and accompanying text (noting the effects of
indecision, hesitation, and error).
217
See infra notes 218–21 and accompanying text (discussing the physiological effects of
stress and unreasonable actions that can occur).
218
See supra note 129 (discussing the unresponsiveness of officers in stressful situations).
213
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the situation has changed, while his mindset and the force he thinks is
reasonable has not.219 This is also problematic because if stress slows
reactions, the officer cannot perform the multi-factored reasonableness
test quickly.220 Finally, varying standards of reasonableness between
individual police officers can be problematic.221
Often an officer’s reasonableness standards will be similar to that of
other officers, but not always.222 For example, what is reasonable to a 6’
5” police officer weighing 240 pounds will not necessarily be reasonable
to a 5’ 10” police officer weighing 150 pounds because what intimidates
one officer might not threaten another.223 This is especially important
when considering the mental distress associated with school shootings
because if officers have differing individual reasonableness standards
when placed in non-stressful situations, they will likely have differing
reasonableness standards when placed in stressful situations.224 This
may also lead to predictability problems and the inability to gauge a coofficer’s actions, which are necessary in situations requiring teamwork.225
Confusion, hesitation, and errors, all of which can endanger innocent
bystanders and fellow officers, may occur without teamwork.226 For the
aforementioned reasons, officers must have a bright-line rule similar to

See supra note 129 (discussing the unresponsiveness of officers in stressful situations).
See supra note 215–16 and accompanying text (discussing the need for officers to
continuously reassess deadly force situations).
221
See infra notes 222–28 and accompanying text (discussing differing standards of
reasonableness for individuals).
222
See Wallentine, supra note 80.
Ask a dozen people when “reasonable and necessary force” to effect an
arrest or detention becomes “excessive force” and you will likely get a
dozen different answers, none of them particularly helpful in
measuring the proper amount of force. Several people may ultimately
question an officer’s use of force and each one may have a different
idea of how to decide whether the force was excessive.
Id.
223
See KINNAIRD, supra note 64, at viii (noting the flexibility needed in police policies,
rather than generic standards, and illustrating this point with a similar example between a
5’2” officer and a 6’2” officer). See also supra note 222 (noting differing answers to
reasonableness).
224
See supra note 218 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of stress on a police
officer’s competency to surroundings).
225
See supra notes 131–33 and accompanying text (discussing the methods and teamwork
skills needed to execute the new tactics implemented by police departments).
226
See also supra note 211 and accompanying text (noting the effects of indecision,
hesitation, and error).
219
220
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the rule carved out in Scott.227 An easy-to-apply rule will also assist
lower courts.228
3.

Problems for Lower Courts in Applying Reasonableness

The greatest problem facing lower courts is when to begin applying
the reasonableness test.229 This inconsistency is problematic because if
lower courts do not know when to begin their inquiries, then an officer’s
actions may be decided incorrectly.230 This poses greater problems for
police officers than courts because court decisions can be reversed,
whereas an officer’s decision to use deadly force, and the consequences
of that action, cannot.231
When lower courts apply an inconsistent standard, police
departments can be misled or confused as to the proper standard.232 This
can cause police officers to act incorrectly and endanger themselves or
others.233 Realizing this, new policies instruct officers to use deadly force
almost immediately, but this too can be problematic.234
C. Problem 3: New, Unclear Police Policies
New police policies implemented around the country force police
officers to act more aggressively than they are accustomed.235 Although
police departments are trained to fire upon active shooters in crowded
and chaotic areas, this is problematic because they are not specialists.236
In fact, they often receive limited training and if they want additional

See generally Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (discussing the Supreme Court’s easy
to apply rule). See also infra Part IV (discussing an easy to apply rule that may be beneficial
to police officers).
228
See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing the problems lower courts have with the application of
the reasonableness test).
229
See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the inconsistency among lower courts).
230
See supra notes 116–19 and accompanying text (discussing the different time frames
courts have applied when determining the reasonableness of an officer’s actions).
231
See supra note 213 and accompanying text (discussing the reversibility of court
decisions, but not police actions).
232
This is why many police departments hire attorneys or professional organizations in
attempts to determine whether a department’s protocols are legally sound. See Wallentine,
supra note 80.
233
See supra note 211 and accompanying text (noting the effects of indecision, hesitation,
and error).
234
See infra Part III.C (discussing the problems with contemporary police policies).
235
Compare Part II.C.2 (discussing new aggressive police tactics), with Part II.C.1
(discussing traditional passive police tactics).
236
See supra notes 126–27 (discussing SWAT tactics and their specialized training).
227
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practice, they must do it on their own.237 This means that strategies
traditionally reserved for specialists, must now be implemented by
amateurs.238 While risky, these policies are momentarily socially
acceptable and justified upon principles of utilitarianism.239 Despite
societal support, the policies' broad, vague language is problematic.240
Broad, vague language can easily be misinterpreted or misapplied,
especially in rapidly changing environments.241 Although the language
itself can be deceiving, it poses greater problems for officers because the
language appearing in new policies, which gives police officers
deference, is the same language courts used under common law.242
Recalling that the Court expressly rejected this language in earlier cases,
there now appears to be a gap between the reasonableness test courts are
instructed to apply and the protocols officers are trained to use.243 This
237
See supra note 129 (discussing the limiting training many officers receive). But see
Harper, supra note 119.
At the same time, he says, he’s glad he had the training. “Even the
thought of it is terrifying, but as long as the nuts are out there, we have
to prepare for them,” he says. He would welcome more training, but
doubts that his department, or any other, can adequately train every
single police officer for a Columbine-style shooting. “The new training
doesn’t come close to what would be needed,” he says. “To be really
prepared for something like that, we would need to be trained almost
weekly.”
Id.
238
See supra Part II.C.2 (noting that officers must use deadly force, regardless of whether
they are comfortable or agree with doing so).
239
See supra note 140 and accompanying text (noting the public’s current acceptance of
the new police tactics).
240
See infra notes 241–44 and accompanying text (discussing the language contained in
these new police policies).
241
See Harper, supra note 119 (noting that the Peoria Police Department’s “sole purpose is
to move right to the shooter and stop him, using whatever force is necessary”); MPD
Training Manual, supra note 124, at 4, 7, 15 (noting the contact team’s goal is to neutralize
the situation); RPD Policy, supra note 130, at 2 (noting the contact team should “[i]nitiate
entry to the building or location to eliminate the threat, i.e. arrest, deadly force, response,
etc.”).
242
Compare supra notes 132–33 and accompanying text (discussing the new police tactics),
and Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108(a) (1982))
(the Court rejected language in the Tennessee Statute that provided a police officer may use
or threaten to use force that is reasonably necessary to accomplish the arrest of an
individual suspected of a criminal act who resists for flees from the arrest), with Tennessee
v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12 (1985) (noting the common law allowed police to use whatever
force was necessary).
243
For a discussion of the language the Court has adopted and rejected, see generally
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (adopting the objective reasonableness test for all
excessive force claims); Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (rejecting the common law language of whatever
force was necessary).
For a discussion of the apparent gap between the language adopted by police
departments and the language adopted by courts, compare Harper, supra note 119 (noting
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means police, though believing their actions are justified, may be held
liable because they relied upon their policies.244
As a result of the aforementioned problems, a bright-line test must
be articulated to grant police departments greater deference during
school shootings and protect them from liability.245 In turn, such a rule
will reduce school violence because: it is not preventative in nature;
restricts the use of a multi-factored reasonableness test, thus allowing
consistent applications by courts and police officers; and allows police
officers to comply with the new policies without fearing liability.
IV. CONTRIBUTION
This Note suggests two proposals for reducing school violence.
First, while optional financial assistance helps prevent school violence, it
does not do so substantially, thus mere reliance upon it should be
avoided. Second, the reasonableness test adopted by the Supreme Court
should include an exception for school shootings, which would create a
bright-line test for police officers’ use of force and bridge the gap
between officer training and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Both of
these proposals create strong deterrents against individuals considering
committing school shootings by preventing weaker-willed individuals
from executing their plans and ending the plans of stronger-willed
individuals early.
Part IV.A discusses reducing the reliance upon optional preventative
measures and proposes that such measures be mandated.246 Part IV.B
proposes that a bright-line test be created for school shootings, thus
replacing the reasonableness test in these situations.247

that the Peoria Police Department’s “sole purpose is to move right to the shooter and stop
him, using whatever force is necessary”); MPD Training Manual, supra note 124, at 4, 7, 15
(noting the contact team’s goal is to neutralize the situation); RPD Policy, supra note 130, at
2 (noting the contact team should “[i]nitiate entry to the building or location to eliminate
the threat, i.e. arrest, deadly force, response, etc.”), with Graham, 490 U.S. at 388 (adopting
the objective reasonableness test for all excessive force claims); Garner, 471 U.S. at 13
(rejecting the common law language of whatever force was necessary).
244
See KINNAIRD, supra note 64, at vii (noting that some officers’ actions were justified
under the law, but those officers did not understand the ramifications of their department’s
policies or that the policy did not protect them from liability).
245
See infra Part IV (suggesting a proposed rule that will reduce school violence, while
affording police departments greater protection from liability).
246
See infra Part IV.A (proposing mandatory preventative measures replace optional
preventative measures).
247
See infra Part IV.B (proposing a bright-line test replace the reasonableness test only in
school shootings).
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A. Reducing Reliance Upon Optional Preventive Measures and Financial
Assistance to Cure School Violence
In general, preventative measures help reduce school violence by
deterring less-determined individuals.248 To make them more effective,
however, legislatures must reduce reliance solely on optional
preventative measures and financial assistance to cure school violence.249
Instead, governing bodies must mandate preventative measures because
optional preventative measures implemented by Congress, state
legislatures, schools, and other entities are insufficient.250 The problem
with optional preventative measures is they allow school officials
discretion to conduct a cost-benefit analysis and determine the need for
such measures. This means that if the costs of improvements exceed the
amount of financial aid received from such improvements, officials
would likely forego improvements altogether because the meager
budget would not allow it. Mandatory preventive measures would turn
out different.
Mandatory school security improvements force school officials to
comply with safety requirements without any discretion, thus allowing
legislatures to fine school districts that fail to comply. While additional
financial assistance can persuade compliance for some school districts, as
shown above, the incentives are not always greater than the cost.
Therefore, the best remedy is imposing punishments on schools not in
compliance. This creates a strong deterrent, while also maximizing the
use of preventive measures in schools and curbing school violence. In
essence, just as strong deterrents prevent students from committing
violent acts, so too will strong deterrents encourage schools to enhance
their security.
In addition to creating a deterrent, the benefits of mandating
preventive measures are three-fold. First, violence by less-determined
shooters will be reduced. Second, officials could not use the budget or
other financial issues as an excuse for not implementing preventative
measures. Finally, mandating school compliance allows exposure to
liability under the tort of negligence.251

See supra Part III.A (discussing the positives and negatives of preventative measures).
See supra notes 153–59 and accompanying text (discussing problems with optional
preventative measures and financial assistance provided by legislatures).
250
See supra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing perpetrator’s claim that medical
detectors would not have been enough).
251
This Note recognizes legislatures are unlikely to adopt such a statute, but theoretically
it is possible. See generally Hanks, supra note 30, at 1–6 (noting student violence in schools,
tort law liability, and immunity granted by states).
248
249
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In conclusion, while preventative measures might not deter strongerwilled shooters, they will reduce some violence. For those shooters not
deterred by preventative measures, officers must resort to deadly force
as the only remaining deterrent.252 The problem is that current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence does not always allow police officers the
unfettered discretion needed to achieve their goals, thus an exception
must be created.253
B. Creating a Bright-Line Rule for School Shootings
The second proposal creates a bright-line rule for police officers by
eliminating the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness test. Under the
current test, courts and officers must consider the severity of the crime,
the immediacy of the threat posed by the suspect to officers and others,
whether the individual is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
arrest, the dangerousness of the suspect’s actions, and the culpability of
the individuals involved.254 Under this proposal, if an apparent
necessity to use deadly force existed, police officers would automatically
be justified in using it and would be immune from liability.255 As a
result, the sole inquiry would be to determine whether a school shooting
was in progress. If the shooting ended, the need for deadly force would
not exist; however, if the shooter was still active, the officers would be
allowed to take all necessary actions to stop him.
Even though such a rule may lead to abuse of power and excessive
force, the utilitarian ideal would outweigh any shooter’s rights. This
reasoning is similar to Justice Scalia’s reasoning in Scott, where the Court
took into account not only the dangerousness posed by the suspect, but
also the culpability of the suspect in relation to the innocence of potential
victims.256 Consequently, Scott suggests that the Court will eliminate the
reasonableness test and create bright-line rules in certain situations.257 A
school shooting is an example of such a situation where a bright-line
See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing police department’s commitment
to deter and prevent school shootings through new police tactics).
253
See infra Part IV.B (discussing the creation of an exception for school shootings).
254
See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the background and standards of the reasonableness
test); supra note 210 and accompanying text (discussing four factors officers should
consider when determining reasonableness).
255
See infra notes 256–71 and accompanying text (discussing proposal).
256
See supra notes 102–13 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion in Scott v. Harris and the addition of a dangerousness requirement which also
considers culpability); supra Part III.B.1 (analyzing Scott v. Harris with the reasonableness
test created in Tennessee v. Garner and Graham v. Connor).
257
See supra notes 199–206 and accompanying text (analyzing Scott v. Harris and creating
bright-line rules in some instances).
252
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standard should be created. Doing so, will reduce school violence,
bridge the gap between the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
and officer training, and provide benefits to officers and courts.
Establishing a bright-line rule will reduce school violence by creating
a strong deterrent. If shooters know they will be killed in the course of
their shooting, some shooters may decide to abandon their plan.
Naturally, not all shooters will be deterred, but if one shooter is deterred
and even one innocent life protected, then the rule will have achieved its
objective.258 Even if no shooters are deterred, adopting this standard will
re-align officer training and Supreme Court jurisprudence, which is
better than the current status.259
As noted earlier, a gap exists between officer training and Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.260 By adopting this bright-line rule, the
Court will accommodate its reasonableness test and officers will be
allowed to use whatever force is necessary to stop the suspect from
committing the crime, which is the same standard police officers are
currently using to stop school shootings.261 As a result, the gap will be
bridged and the chance of officer liability reduced substantially. Though
immunity is important, there are many other benefits to officers as well.
Perhaps the most important benefit is allowing officers to react
instinctively and quickly to the constantly changing environment, rather
than forcing them to justify their actions prior to acting and risk
indecision or hesitation.262 In a chaotic deadly situation such as a school
shooting, the worst action an officer can take is to hesitate or decide not
to act. This jeopardizes their lives and also the lives of innocent people
caught in the crossfire.
Additionally, adopting a bright-line rule eliminates the requirement
that officers constantly reassess the situation. Instead, officers only need
to know whether the shooter is still active. If he is, officers know deadly
force is justifiable and can neutralize him; if not, officers know deadly
force is inappropriate. It is an easy “on/off switch,” which differs from
Garner.263 Moreover, it allows officers to make reasonable and rational
258
See supra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing perpetrator’s claim that medical
detectors would not have been enough).
259
See supra notes 242–44 and accompanying text (discussing the gap between the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness test and officer tactics).
260
See supra notes 242–44 and accompanying text (discussing the gap and extent to which
it has reached).
261
See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the current police policies and tactics to reduce school
shootings).
262
See supra note 211 and accompanying text (discussing the risk of indecision and
hesitation).
263
See supra note 189 and accompanying text (discussing the on/off switch avoided in
Tennessee v. Garner).
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decisions because they can focus on eliminating the risk, rather than
reassessing the situation.264
Finally, establishing this standard will create uniform police action
by reducing differing individual standards of reasonableness.265 This
cures potential differences between the 6’5” officer and the 5’10” officer
in the above illustration.266 As a result co-officers can better predict each
other’s actions and provide safer conditions for themselves and innocent
bystanders.267 Although officers reap many benefits, courts also benefit
from an easier standard.
For courts, adopting the common law standard allows application of
more uniform and consistent standards.268
This also eliminates
confusion for officers because the standards applied by the courts would
be consistent.269 As a result, officers will act reasonably and reduce the
chance of accidental injuries because, rather than reassessing
reasonableness, officers can think and act quickly and clearly.270
Consequently, both courts and officers benefit from adopting the
common law standard.
If both proposals are implemented, students like Billy would either
abandon their plans or be prematurely stopped by police. Either way,
lives are saved.
With mandatory preventive measures, Billy may have decided to
forego his plans because he would have seen the difficulty of entering
school while possessing a firearm. Moreover, if he still attempted to
enter, officers could immediately stop him. Consequently, the lives of
nearly fifty individuals would have been saved, including his own,
which now will be spent in prison.
Alternatively, if Billy was able to evade the preventative measures
and begin shooting, the lives lost would be substantially reduced
because rather than establish a perimeter and wait for the S.WA.T. team,
officers could have entered the school and stopped Billy with any force
See supra notes 209–20 and accompanying text (discussing problems reassessments
cause police officers).
265
See supra notes 222–26 and accompanying text (discussing problems posed by
individual reasonableness standards).
266
See supra notes 222–24 and accompanying text (comparing one police officer’s
reasonableness standards to another).
267
See supra notes 211, 225 and accompanying text (discussing police officer safety and
the teamwork required to execute new police tactics).
268
See supra Parts II.B.3, III.B.3 (discussing problems lower courts have encountered
when applying the reasonableness test).
269
See supra notes 230–33 and accompanying text (discussing how inconsistent court
standards could mislead police departments).
270
See supra 233 and accompanying text (discussing how consistent standards will reduce
accidental injury and death).
264
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necessary. While officers could have done this volitionally, they would
have been exposed to liability and would have to comply with the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness test. This could lead to the potential
problems illustrated above.271 By adopting this second proposal, police
officers are saved from the problems posed by the reasonableness test,
are protected from liability, and numerous lives are saved because Billy
would have only had minutes to execute his plan, rather than an hour.
Therefore, it would not have been impossible for Billy to kill some
students, but by implementing the proposals, the number of lives lost
and the chance of liability for officers would have been substantially
reduced.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite numerous attempts by schools and legislatures to curb
school violence, the plague continues. The central problem with these
previous attempts is the discretion given to officials. Preventative
measures and financial assistance can help, but solely relying upon
optional programs has been inadequate. As a result, police departments
have revamped their active shooter procedures.
It was not until recently that police departments recognized the need
to change active shooter policies and take a proactive stance by granting
officers greater latitude regarding the use of force. While police
departments altered procedures, legislatures and courts have not
changed the reasonableness test to protect officers from liability. As a
result, a growing gap exists between officers training and how courts
expect officers to react. To bridge the gap, a bright-line rule must be
adopted.
Taken together, both proposals will reduce school violence by
deterring weak and strong-willed shooters. It is not a fool-proof
solution, but absolute security does not exist. The best thing to hope for
is that the next time Billy visits Wilson High School; he will abandon his
plans because police officers will be stalking the halls.
Tyler Pratt*
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See supra Part III.B (discussing the problems associated with reasonableness tests and
school shootings).
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